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ABSTRACT 
Understandings of the Founding Era have been under continuous debate since 
the American Revolution itself. Whether one examines the Articles of Confederation or 
the Continental Congresses, the successes, failures, and significance of each have 
been argued over since the beginning. By looking at American understandings of crucial 
ideas about government and society during the American Revolution, including the 
foundation of American rights, we can better come to terms with an understanding of 
American identity. These understandings evolved during the American Revolution, and 
their evolution can be examined through the resolutions, debates, correspondence, and 
diaries of members of Congress from the the First Continental Congress in 1774 to the 
adoption of the Declaration of Independence in July of 1776. The Declaration 
represented the synthesis of natural law thought with British constitutionalism that was 
forged out of the necessity of compromise during the lead up to war in 1774, the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1775, and the subsequent escalation into war shortly thereafter, 
exhibiting the importance of wartime exigencies in the evolution of American thought. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
No revolution has ever sprung forth, fully blown and fully armed like 
Athena, from the brow of existing society; no revolution has ever emerged 
from a vacuum. No revolution has ever been born out of ideas alone, but 
only from a long chain of abuses and a long history of preparation, 
ideological and institutional. 
—Murray N. Rothbard, Conceived in Liberty 
 
Understandings of the Founding Era have been under continuous debate since 
the American Revolution itself. Whether one examines the Articles of Confederation or 
the Continental Congresses, the successes, failures, and significance of each have 
been argued over since the beginning. These debates are not trivial, either. By looking 
at American understandings of crucial ideas about government and society during the 
American Revolution, including the foundation of American rights, we can better come 
to terms with an understanding of American identity. As Gordon Wood has said, many 
Americans' identities are attached to their understanding of the founding era and 
founding generation1—itself a rather unique phenomenon—so any study that attempts 
to come to grips with the American founding has the potential to alter Americans' 
understanding of their own identities. 
This thesis will examine the evolving American understanding of government, 
sovereignty, and its relation to society during the American Revolution by studying the 
acts and debates of members of Congress—from the First Continental Congress in 
                                               
1 Gordon S. Wood, “What Made the Founders Different,” Lecture, Mercer University, 
Macon, GA, November 17, 2011. 
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1774 to the adoption of the Declaration of Independence in July of 1776. The 
Continental Congress was Americans’ first attempt at a national government and gave 
birth to national politics and can tell us much about how Americans understood their 
sovereignty. However, this period is notable because of the exigencies of the war that 
framed it. In short, it was not ordinary politics but extraordinary circumstances that 
shaped American Republican thought.  
In order to accomplish this task, it is important to consider the legal and 
constitutional meanings of the resolutions and acts of both Congress and the states, in 
order to answer important questions about how Congress and its actions would be 
practically understood: How were the state delegates’ authorizations worded; what 
powers did the delegates give them? How did the Congress word its acts, and what 
significance did this have for sovereignty; i.e., in the Continental Congress, their “acts” 
were resolutions, but is this law, as we think of Federal legislation today? How did 
members of Congress perceive Congress’ powers? Was it truly a government? We do 
not consider the United Nations a government, nor even the European Union; should 
the American confederation in the Continental Congress be understood differently? To 
what extent did Congressional resolves depend on the direct action of states? How did 
Congress react to state non-compliance with their resolutions and requisitions? What 
penalty or consequence was there for states that acted contrary to Congressional 
resolution; i.e., were these binding, or carried the threat of force behind them—or were 
they more like treaties, dependent upon the will of the parties to the treaty? Questions 
like these are important because if we misunderstand the nature and scope of authority 
under the Continental Congresses, it will skew how we view their relation to the events 
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of the Revolution. For instance, if we (erroneously) viewed the Congress as a proto-
centralized state whose acts were equivalent to law, and thus construed the scope of 
Congressional authority broadly, one would be tempted to read into the Congressional 
debates the wrong ideas and thinkers. Additionally, this would affect how one viewed 
the trajectory from the Continental Congresses to the Articles of Confederation, and 
ultimately to the Constitution.  
After considering the Congressional resolutions themselves, the next important 
consideration is what ideas were members of Congress relying on when debating what 
steps to take during the immediate lead up to war and as they managed the war effort.2 
Secondly, how did the American understanding of these ideas change over time in 
relation to the war effort? Do we see more radical ideas supplanting practical concerns, 
or perhaps do we see the same prominent ideas on display, just with different 
emphases or new understandings attached? In order to do this, it requires going 
beneath the resolutions of the Continental Congresses and examining the debates that 
led to the adoption of resolutions. For source material, then, it requires using the 
journals of members of the Continental Congress, as well as their letters, situating the 
answers to these questions within the deep historiography of the American Revolution.  
As much as the American Revolution has been focused on, and as much as 
scholars have paid attention to the workings of the Continental Congress and 
Confederation Congress, studies relating to the American understandings of 
government and society during the American Revolution have missed an important 
opportunity to examine in detail changing American understandings of society and 
government through the Continental Congress.  
                                               
2 And, by implication, thinkers. 
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         The history of the American Revolution presents as dense a field of historiography 
as any topic in American history, save perhaps the Civil War and Abraham Lincoln. As 
such, wading through it is no small task, and one that can only present the briefest of 
overviews. For most of the older historiography, it will be loosely divided into schools of 
thought, as set out by Jack P. Greene.3 From there, this review will focus on the works 
that are most relevant to the issue at hand in greater depth.  
          Man desires freedom above all else, and the American Revolution was, in the 
main, a struggle for liberty. This was the classic view in the nineteenth century among 
American historians, such as George Bancroft, who wrote his History of the United 
States over a period of forty years.4 Throughout, he praised the advances in liberty and 
institutions the Revolution brought about and thought the Revolution was an exercise in 
patriotism. Thus, American history was whiggish and teleologically oriented toward 
striving for freedom and becoming independent from colonial rule. 5 This view was 
shared by British historians W.E.H. Lecky and George Otto Trevelyan. 
           As the nineteenth century wore on, the scientific method gained ground, 
culminating in the call for more objective history. Herbert Levi Osgood, in an important 
turn-of-the-century essay on the American Revolution, asserted that the Revolution had 
to be understood in a British imperial context, not just a colonial context. Taking this into 
consideration, it was then rational for British imperial officials to change colonial policy 
from one of salutary neglect to a more hands on approach. George Louis Beer took this 
                                               
3 Jack P. Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in Recent Historical 
Literature,” in The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, ed. Jack P. Greene (New York; 
Evanston; London: Harper & Row, 1968): 2-74. 
4 George Bancroft, History of the United States, 10 vols. (Boston: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1834-1874). 
5 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 3-4. 
 
 
 
5 
idea and pointed to the Seven Years war and the colonists’ disloyalty and provincialism 
in order to understand the “tighten[ing of] imperial ties.” Beer saw this as generally 
characteristic of colonial attitudes and their destiny for independence. Likewise, Osgood 
agreed with Bancroft that the colonial past explained the Revolution, focusing on the 
“social and political tendencies...toward independence” of the colonists, instead of the 
oppressive measures of the British, sharing this position with Beer.6 
Above all else, the imperial historians put British colonial and imperial policy into 
a framework that emphasized its rationality, and thus undermined the tyrannical 
interpretation that had prevailed in America since the eighteenth century. Furthermore, 
they emphasized what caused American ideas to diverge from British ideas, which 
included the removal of the French from a position of power in North America and the 
conquest of Canada.7 The imperial context added a layer of complexity onto 
Revolutionary history, but the view that a rational movement by the British toward a 
hands-on approach meant an undermining of the tyrannical interpretation was wrong; 
the two were not mutually exclusive. 
The Progressive conception arose around the politics of progressivism, which 
meant a focus on democracy, human rights and their origins, and the lower classes. 
What they found were divisions in American society during the Revolution that whiggish 
historians like Bancroft had failed to consider, namely divisions of social class. Actors in 
the revolution were conceptualized in terms of economic actors motivated by self-
interest, not in terms of their ideas. The upper classes sought to protect conservative 
                                               
6 Ibid. 3-10. 
7 Ibid., 4-7; Herbert Levi Osgood, “The American Revolution,” Political Science Quarterly 
13 (March 1898): 41-59; George Louis Beer, British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1907). 
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values of property rights and their class interest, while the lower classes fought for the 
franchise and equality. Studies in the first decade of the twentieth century by Carl L. 
Becker and Charles H. Lincoln reflected these themes, finding “that the Revolutionary 
controversy in both colonies was strongly conditioned by pre existing conflicts within 
them.” Arthur M. Schlesinger made similar arguments for colonial merchants, pointing 
out the similarity of their actions through 1776, varying their rhetoric in concert as British 
policy affected their economic interests. Schlesinger also argued that the Revolution 
was less about “abstract governmental rights” and more about their practical shifting of 
positions and rhetoric as it suited their interests. Charles A. Beard most famously 
argued this interpretation in 1913, examining the economic interests of the signatories 
to the Constitution and concluding the document was primarily motivated to protect their 
class interests. Even more, the Constitution was thus a repudiation of the Revolutionary 
ideals, since it represented conservative values designed to prevent the excesses of 
democracy.8 This more practical, self-interested view of the Revolutionaries coincided 
with the writings of Randolph G. Adams and Becker, who each found that “step by step, 
from 1764 to 1776…[the colonists] modified their theory to suit their needs,” varying 
                                               
8 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 9-12; Carl L. Becker, History of 
Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (Madison, Wis.: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1909); Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 
1760-1776 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1901); Arthur Meier Schlesinger, 
The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1917); 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The American Revolution Reconsidered,” Political Science Quarterly 34 
(March 1919): 61-78; Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New 
York: Macmillan, 1913); Murray N. Rothbard, “Modern Historians Confront the American 
Revolution,” Literature of Liberty 1, no. 1 (January/March 1978): 17. 
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between lofting abstract natural rights rhetoric and economic arguments as it fit their 
current affairs.9 
 In this sense, since they believed it was the merchant class and their interests 
driving revolution, it was not a revolution seeking to overturn all societal norms, but to 
overturn British imperial policy which had recently put their economic interests on 
unsure footing. They disagreed with the historians who focused on the role of ideas in 
bringing about the Revolution, whether it was ideas of British Constitutionalism or 
Lockean Liberalism. Progressives had to explain why so many Revolutionary writers 
wrote sincerely about these ideas, which they did by labelling it “propaganda.” In this 
respect, they came to agree with the Imperial school historians who thought it was 
American propaganda that pushed otherwise reticent colonies towards revolution. 
Insofar as the Progressives overlooked that Lockean liberal ideology included within it 
an understanding of economic liberty, Progressives missed the importance of ideas and 
liberalism to their drive for revolution; and, indeed, the importance of republican ideas.10 
Merrill Jensen extended the progressive interpretation to the Confederation 
period with The Articles of Confederation, arguing against the whiggish interpretation 
that saw the Confederation period as one bungle after another, instead noticing 
“significant accomplishment in the disposition of western lands,” a Depression that was 
not as bad as it seemed, and political advances toward eliminating the trade barriers 
and debt burdens that had accumulated during the Revolution and the Confederation 
                                               
9 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 13; Randolph G. Adams, The 
Political Ideas of the American Revolution (Durham, N.C.: Trinity College Press, 1922); Carl L. 
Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study on the History of ... Study on the History of 
Political Ideas (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922). 
10 Rothbard, “Modern Historians,” 16-18. 
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period.11 It was uncritical acceptance of the Federalist arguments for the Constitution 
that had permitted the creation and survival of the overwhelmingly negative view of the 
Articles of Confederation, according to Jensen.  
In Jensen’s view, the focal points of the movement toward Revolution in the 
colonies were British policy, internal social upheaval, and control of the Continental 
Congresses. Jensen argued that historians who denied the reality of political parties in 
the Congresses were wrong. Membership in any given faction was fluid, Jensen 
acknowledged, and people changed sides—even frequently.12 However, Jensen 
stretched the definition of a party, since a party without any continuity among its 
membership isn’t much of a party at all, but a shell. Eliminating the overarching source 
of authority over the colonies (Britain) made it a simpler situation for the colonists to 
decide how to divide powers and locate sovereignty, said Jensen, yet the proper 
location of sovereignty was still an open question during this period.13 One of the major 
changes taking place during the Revolution was the democratizing of politics, especially 
the essential eradication of colonial governor appointments from Britain in favor of 
officials responsive to voters.14 
Since Merrill Jensen first pointed it out, many historians have recognized that 
taking The Federalist’s arguments at face value was bound to lead to a biased 
understanding of the Articles of Confederation because of The Federalist’s 
propagandistic nature. Prior to The Articles of Confederation, works like A Constitutional 
                                               
11 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 15; Merrill Jensen, The 
Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American 
Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940). 
12 Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, vii, xii. 
13 Ibid., xiii. 
14 Ibid., xviii. 
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History of the United States, by Andrew McLaughlin, took an uncritical view of The 
Federalist, finding that “Almost everything points only in one direction—toward the need 
of a competent central government and the necessity of finding a system of union which 
could maintain itself.”15 
 In the Post-World War II era, historians began challenging the core of the 
Progressive interpretations, and historical interpretations of the Revolution generally. 
Oliver M. Dickerson, for instance, saw the navigation acts as the “cement of empire” 
that tied the colonies to Britain, and against which the colonists had little antagonism 
before 1764. It was with the substitution of “a policy of trade taxation for the older 
system of trade protection and encouragement” that the colonists—especially those in 
the merchant cities—began voicing their hardships grievously.16 Britain responded with 
even stricter controls and heavier burdens; the colonists responded with greater 
evasion, harsher denouncements, and increasing rebellion. This continued until a 
breaking point was reached, and conflict broke out. Other historians disagreed, 
including Thomas C. Barrow, Curtis P. Nattels, and Lawrence A. Harper. Barrow argued 
that it was the salutary neglect that the colonists favored, not the navigation acts 
themselves, while Nattels and Harper conducted essentially cost-benefit analyses to 
conclude the acts had costs that outweighed the benefits to the colonists.17 
                                               
15 Ibid., 5; Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States (New 
York: 1937), 137. 
16 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 19-20; Oliver M. Dickerson, 
The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1951). 
17 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 20-21; Thomas C. Barrow, 
Trade & Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1600-1775 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Curtis P. Nattels, “British Mercantilism and the 
Economic Development of the Thirteen Colonies,” Journal of Economic History 12 (Spring 
1952): 105-114; Lawrence A. Harper, “The Effects of the Navigation Acts on the Thirteen 
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 Other arguments concerned the relationship of the colonies to Britain, the laxity 
of which Jack Greene argued was amiable to the colonists. Greene also found that the 
political culture in the colonies before 1763 was elitist, with rival factions of elites who 
vied for control of political office and change within the leadership of the class, rather 
than conflict between the upper and lower classes for control of positions of power. At 
best, he said, social structure may have “aggravated” or intensified opposition to Britain, 
rather than “to have created the movement or to have been necessary for it to occur”: 
Everywhere relations with Britain were relatively harmonious prior to 1763 and 
politics within the colonies were primarily elitist in nature. Public office….and 
political leadership were securely in the hands of upper-class groups, and, 
although there were occasional manifestations of social and economic discontent 
among the lower classes, that discontent never resulted in widespread demands 
for basic changes in the customary patterns of upper—class leadership. Political 
divisions, despite the earlier contentions of Lincoln and Becker, were not along 
class lines and not between rival ideological groups of radicals and 
conservatives. Rather, they revolved around the ambitions of rival factions 
among the elite.18 
Robert E. and B. Katherine Brown confirmed this with their studies Middle-Class 
Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780 and Virginia, 1705-1786: 
Democracy or Aristocracy?, where they concluded that the social structure in these 
colonies was relatively flat and devoid of the extremes of inequality that cause class 
                                                                                                                                                       
Colonies,” in The Era of the American Revolution: Studies Inscribed to Evarts Boutell Greene, 
ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 1-39. 
18 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 28; Jack P. Greene, “The 
Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and Interpretation,” Political Science 
Quarterly 88, no. 1 (March 1973): 3-4, 18. 
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conflict. Jackson Turner Main, similarly, argued that whatever inequalities there were, 
the extremes of poverty were not prevalent.19 
 For Daniel J. Boorstin, writing in The Genius of American Politics, the Revolution 
was profoundly conservative. It was fought over “the true constitution of the British 
empire” and entailed virtually no change in the views and leadership of the community 
to implement the system forged in the Revolution.20 Bernard Bailyn complemented this 
view by explaining how, then, the American Revolution was revolutionary; it was 
conservative in the respect that the colonists didn’t seek the radical overthrow of the 
British government or of society generally, but pursued a “radical idealization and 
rationalization of the previous century and a half of American experience,” which would 
harmonize the colonial experience with the Enlightenment ideals.21 
 Critiques of Charles Beard and his economic interpretation of the Constitution 
spread like wildfire in the 1950s, with critiques by Richard Hofstadter, Douglass Adair, 
Edmund S. Morgan, and Forrest McDonald. Morgan and others rightly charged Beard 
with distorting the historical evidence and reading his progressive politics into the 
historical record, severing the ties between liberty and property that permeated 
American revolutionary-era political thought. Beard tried to draw a twentieth-century 
distinction between human rights and property rights and then fit the evidence into this 
                                               
19 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 29; Robert E. Brown and B. 
Katherine Brown, Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955); Robert E. Brown and B. Katherine Brown, 
Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy? (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University 
Press, 1964); Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965). 
20 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 50; Daniel J. Boorstin, The 
Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). 
21 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 55-56; Bernard Bailyn, 
“Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century America,” American 
Historical Review 67 (January 1962): 339-351; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University. Press, 1967). 
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framework of economic conflict, which was an anachronistic failure. McDonald built on 
this by carrying out the Beardian research agenda, finding no “consolidated economic 
group” at the Philadelphia convention, nor a consolidated geographic interest: the 
convention was one of pluralistic interests that defied a simple categorization by 
economic self-interest that Beard had proposed. For McDonald, then, any economic 
interpretation of the Constitution had to be situated in a framework of overlapping “state, 
sectional, group, and individual interests” that competed over the provisions of the 
Constitution, with divisions among the states constituting the basic units of analysis.22 
 A number of other works in the coming decades focused on the politics of the 
Congresses as well. In Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774-1787, Joseph L. Davis 
argued that the distinguishing feature of the politics of the Congresses was its division 
into sectional factions. Contrarily, in Party Politics in the Continental Congresses, H. 
James Henderson argued that the Congress was divided into primitive parties and 
tended to vote according to these factional interests. Jack Rakove disagreed with both, 
arguing that Congress was not divided into sectional or party factions, but was rather 
reactionary, or acting according to the changing context. Similarly, Merrill Jensen 
argued that on each specific issue there were opposing sectional interests with grouping 
that were so inconsistent—small states vs. large states, extensive slavery vs.  minor 
slavery, trading vs. agrarian. etc.—that “sectional lines were so broken as to become 
                                               
22 Greene, “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution,” 59; Richard Hofstadter, 
“Beard and the Constitution: the History of an Idea,” American Quarterly 2 (Fall 1950): 195-212; 
Douglas Adair, “The Tenth Federalist Revisited” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. ser., 8 
(January 1951): 48-67; Edmund S. Morgan, “American Revolution: Revisions in Need of 
Revising,” William and Mary Quarterly, 14 (Jan. 1957): 3-15; Edmund S. Morgan, The Birth of 
the Republic: 1763-89 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Forrest McDonald, We 
The People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958). 
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meaningless.” Earlier, Edmund Burnett’s The Continental Congress presented the first 
systematic reconstruction of the debates and proceedings of the Continental 
Congresses that was based on his extensive collection of letters from members of the 
Congress that he published into eight volumes called Letters from Members of the 
Continental Congress. It was significant because of the primacy of its reconstructive, 
rather than interpretive, element.23 
Early Years of the Republic, by Herbert Aptheker, a Marxist historian, took a look 
at the American Republic in the years from the Articles of Confederation to the first 
administration of Washington in order to examine the character of the social and 
political changes during the period, with a special regard to the confederation itself. His 
thesis was that the Articles of Confederation was the first attempt, or first step, to 
centralizing politics in the states, with the Constitution in 1787 representing the 
culmination of the American nationalist impulse, not a conservative counterrevolution 
against the radical tendencies of the American revolutionaries. As he said it, “The 
Constitution of the United States, as originally drafted, was a bourgeois-democratic 
document for the governing of a slaveholder-capitalist republic.”24 Hence, he didn’t view 
the earlier Continental Congresses as instances of the consolidation of power, but they 
fit within the overall trend, since there had been no deliberative body common to all the 
colonies except for Britain. 
                                               
23 Joseph L. Davis, Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774-1787 (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1977); H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental 
Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974); Jack Rakove, The Beginnings of 
National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1979); Jensen, Articles, 56; Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1941). 
24 Herbert Aptheker, Early Years of the Republic: From the End of the Revolution to the 
First Administration of Washington (1783-1793) (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 55. 
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Aptheker tracked the political changes leading to the adoption of the Articles of 
Confederation in 1781, finding that among the bourgeoisie, the propensity to expand 
trade and commerce to national levels corresponded with a desire to expand 
government to national levels. He said that the Articles of Confederation gathered 
support during the war due to the exigencies of war, growing inflation, and “the needs of 
diplomacy and commerce.”25 Other changes included removing full authority from 
Congress to managing Indian affairs, removing authority over the Western territories, 
and adding into the supermajority provision the choice of commander-in-chief and the 
apportionment of tax revenue among the states. Its most notable feature, however, was 
still its expansion of centralized power in a confederate government. One of the 
significant aspects of this study is it suggests that the American political order has had a 
rich and varied tradition, and particularly that something of value can be gained by the 
contemporary political observer looking at the Continental Congresses and the Articles 
of Confederation—it is not simply a “failed experiment” that invariably led to the 
Federalist triumph in 1787 and 1789. 
 One of the most influential books on the Founding period was Jack Rakove’s The 
Beginnings of National Politics. In it, he argued that the Continental Congress was 
primarily driven by the practical exigencies of, at first, looming war, and then managing 
the war effort and maintaining unity among the colonies. As he stated, his study 
“emphasizes the extent to which the halting and at times haphazard progress of 
                                               
25 Interestingly, Aptheker notes that the first draft of the Articles came to be gradually 
reduced in the scope of national authority. One notable example is that the first draft written by 
John Dickinson originally reserved to each state “as much of its present Laws, Rights, and 
Customs as it may think fit, and...the sole and exclusive Regulation and Government of its 
internal police”, which was changed to the flat retention by each state of “its sovereignty, 
freedom, and independence”; Ibid., 7-8. 
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confederation allowed new problems to be raised, old ones once thought solved to be 
reopened, and others to go unexplored.”26 While the Congress was, in its principles, of 
the Revolution, the actions of the Congress were not ideologically driven;27 nor can we 
look to economic interests, regional politics (Joseph Davis), or partisan struggles (Merrill 
Jensen) for our understanding of the actions of the Congresses. The Revolution thrust a 
succession of challenges onto the colonies and the Congresses that dictated what is 
was necessary for Congress to do.28 
 Rakove pointed out that the authority of Congress derived from the colonies’ 
committees of correspondence, quasi-governmental bodies that were organized by 
Revolutionaries for the purpose of coordinating opposition to Britain. The Congress was 
a deliberative body—meaning no group or colony dominated policy-making—charged 
with administering the common affairs of the colonies and promoting unity. It was not 
nearly as factional as other scholars have argued. Rakove disagreed with Merrill Jensen 
who believed that the Articles of Confederation was the result of an identifiable body of 
sentiments; instead, the Articles were created in a process that was not dominated by 
factional interests pursuing their particular ends, but by men who understood the needs 
of the colonies and melded Congress to fit that role. It follows a “nationalist” 
interpretation of the Articles of Confederation in that the Articles, he maintained, were 
                                               
26 Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics, 136. 
27 By this, I just mean that it was not dogmatic and if one compares the resolutions 
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intended to subordinate the states to the federal Congress.29 The argument of scholars 
like Merrill Jensen and H. James Henderson held that the Lees of Virginia and the 
Adamses of Massachusetts were a cohesive radical faction that pushed the country 
toward war, while Rakove saw a notable lack of factions (there were only loose 
affiliations) and a very reactionary Congress. Therefore, his study was primarily a study 
in the politics of the Congresses, rather than their ideas. This practical political aspect of 
the Continental Congresses appears right, but Rakove seemed to downplay the way in 
which ideology and history shaped the terms of the debate that did happen, even 
though he was scrupulous in reconstructing the context and circumstances in which the 
Congresses acted. While it is important to recognize the significance that the 
Continental Congresses were temporary bodies that were limited by the goals of unity 
and managing the war, the structure and scope of the Congress was strictly limited on 
paper to fit within the confines of Revolutionary ideology. For the First Continental 
Congress specifically, it bore no resemblance to a government.30  
In Jerrilyn Marston’s book, King and Congress, Marston argued that the 
Continental Congress was most efficient acting in its executive capacity, and that the 
authority of King George of Britain was effectively transferred to the Congress by 1776. 
Its apparent success in this role was not primarily a feature of its design—though 
Congress was designated executive functions—but a result of its usurpation of 
executive authority amid popular support to do so. King and Congress is very amenable 
to the interpretation offered by Rakove in that they both rejected a radical Congress and 
stressed its deliberative nature leading to deliberate, incremental steps. However, 
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Marston submitted that the replication of the crown was both the source of its partial 
success and the source of its authority, which need not have been true—and probably 
was not. Rakove pointed to counterexamples that showed there were issues under 
debate at the time about the proper scope of executive power in Congress that bear on 
the issue of Crown replication, e.g. Indian relations, and other areas in which the 
Congress differed in executive authority from the Crown.31 
More recently, Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation, by Keith L. 
Dougherty, focused on the troop and money-raising ability of Congress, arguing that 
while public goods theory suggests that the states would rarely (if ever) pay their 
requisitions, the states in fact contributed a remarkable amount of men and resources to 
the war effort and during the subsequent peace. This happened not because of civic 
virtue, but because of self-interest—whenever the state stood to gain locally, it could be 
expected to pay its requisitions.32 Dougherty claimed that from the beginning, the 
Congress was “an administrative body at the center of a state alliance rather than a 
national government managing national affairs.” He considered the two goals of the 
Confederation to be preserving state sovereignty and furthering common state interests, 
evident in the self-interested actions taken by the states.33 
Revolutionary America 1763-1815, by Francis D. Cogliano, is a political history of 
the American Revolution broadly conceived, beginning with the end of salutary neglect 
in 1763 and ending with the close of the War of 1812 with Britain. Cogliano framed his 
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understanding of the period differently than many of the other scholars, arguing “that the 
fundamental question between 1763 and 1815 in the American colonies….concerned 
relations with Europe.” While this proposition was clearly true, this re-focus on British 
relations gave a greater importance to trans-Atlantic relations than circumstances 
contained within America or Britain. Coinciding with Jack Rakove’s reactionary view of 
Congress, Cogliano maintained that the colonies as a whole were reactionary in respect 
to trans-Atlantic changes.34 
 In Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding, by David C. 
Hendrickson, Hendrickson stressed that the unity of the colonies was not such that they 
were a single nation or a single people:  
the sense of common nationality was more a consequence of mutual 
entanglement and exiguous necessity than of a sense of common peoplehood. 
At the beginning, in 1776, Americans constituted not a body politic but an 
association of bodies politic, readily recognizable to eighteenth-century 
taxonomists of political forms as a “league of firm friendship,” a “république 
fédérative,” or a “system of states.”35 
This question of whether the American colonies had coalesced into one people, one 
ideology, or one political mind was prevalent throughout the work of many twentieth 
century historians of the American Revolution, not to mention Supreme Court Justices 
such as Justice Joseph Story. In Seedtime of the Republic, for instance, Clinton 
Rossiter argued that the colonies had merged into a single political tradition that valued 
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“ethical, ordered liberty” as a result of the colonial experience. Similarly, in Seeds of 
Liberty: The Genesis of the American Mind, Max Savelle argued that the colonists had 
merged into a single, distinct, identifiable American culture, with loyalty and patriotism 
for America itself, even if during the Seven Years War “this American loyalty was 
submerged under an orgy of British patriotic sentiment.” Merrill Jensen disagreed, 
finding that the sentiments of John Adams toward Massachusetts echoed the 
sentiments of most Americans toward their colonies: to each colonist, his “country” was 
his colony, and their nationalist sentiment was bound up in this, rather than any bond 
between the colonies.36 However, as the evidence will show, the American colonies 
were clearly not one people legally, and in fact the First Congress continually listed 
each of the states individually in their resolutions—they did not pretend to be direct 
representatives of the American people in the aggregate. 
 One of the most drawn out debates about the American Revolution concerned 
what ideas and thinkers influenced the colonists during the American Revolution. 
Scholars argued over the influence of ideology on the American colonists; some argued 
Liberal ideas were most prevalent, others said Republican ideas were dominant, while a 
third group argued against ideological motivation, instead pointing to class interests as 
the motivating factor. 
 Progressive historians, beginning with Charles A. Beard, saw American leaders 
trying to protect their class interests, as well as economically motivated to struggle 
against British trade restrictions and taxes. In this sense, since they believed it was the 
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merchant class and their interests driving revolution, it was not a revolution seeking to 
overturn all societal norms, but to overturn British imperial policy which had recently put 
their economic interests on unsure footing. They disagreed with the historians who 
focused on the role of ideas in bringing about the Revolution, whether it was ideas of 
British Constitutionalism or Lockean Liberalism. The only role for ideas, in this 
interpretation, was “propaganda.”37 In this respect, they came to agree with the Imperial 
school historians who thought it was American propaganda that pushed otherwise 
reticent colonies towards revolution. Insofar as the Progressives overlooked that 
Lockean liberal ideology included within it an understanding of economic liberty, 
Progressives missed the importance of ideas and liberalism to their drive for revolution; 
and, indeed, the importance of republican ideas. 
Following World War II, many historians wanted to distinguish the American from 
the French Revolution, as well as the ideological or economic doctrines and interests 
that were represented in the latter. As such, writers like Daniel Boorstin and Clinton 
Rossiter saw the Revolution as a more practical and conservative attempt to solve the 
problems created by British colonial policy. They saw a series of deliberate steps by 
colonists to respond to the escalations of the British that were generally supported by 
the broader American public. Many of these same writers also fell into Louis Hartz’s 
liberal historiographic tradition, focusing on how eighteenth century American writers 
brought Locke’s liberal political philosophy down to earth in a way that was relevant and 
readable to eighteenth century Americans.38 This paradigm stressed an emerging liberal 
consensus in colonial America that was not amenable to British restrictions that 
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encroached on the natural rights of Americans. Locke’s views, whether filtered through 
other thinkers or not, Louis Hartz said, were so powerful to American colonists because 
their society mirrored a Lockean society: “individualistic, ambitious, protocapitalist.”39 
This tradition also stressed the moderation and reasonableness of the American 
revolution, usually the result of the Lockean structure of society or their resonance with 
his principles, as compared with the French Revolution with terroristic excesses. 
Unfortunately, it minimized the seething social conflicts established by the Beardians by 
considering “every conceivable demonstration of conflict short of Jacobin or Bolshevist 
revolution” as not “meaningful.”40 
Bernard Bailyn achieved a breakthrough from the Hartzian scholarship, although 
he explicitly recognized Locke’s influence on the colonists. Bailyn found that the 
colonists were influenced by writings and pamphlets written by republicans from the 
early eighteenth century through to the Revolution, particularly Cato’s Letters, written by 
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, finding Locke’s influence to be one among many 
for eighteenth century pamphleteers. He also pointed out that the colonists’ grand 
rhetoric was meant not merely to propagandize. It was a meaningful expression of the 
colonists’ understanding of the situation, contrary to Beard who claimed their rhetoric 
was all smoke and mirrors since what drove the colonists were class interests. Bailyn 
argued that it was “an ideological, constitutional, political struggle,” not a social struggle; 
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it was one connected to intellectual development that permitted Americans to look at 
their recent experience through a radical lens.41 
The republican paradigm, pioneered by Gordon Wood, Bernard Bailyn, and JGA 
Pocock, represented a more pluralistic account of the intellectual history of the 
American Revolution that stressed a competing republican ideology that held sway 
among American colonists at the same time that many were influenced by liberal 
views.42 Some, such as Robert Kelley, would even argue “that republicanism was the 
distinctive political consciousness of the entire Revolutionary generation.”43 Edmund S. 
Morgan and Gordon Wood wrote about the revolutionary anxieties many Americans 
faced because of their view of the cyclical, rather than progressive, sense of history. 
There was an anxiety because of how easily they thought republics could be corrupted 
and how shortly they lasted.44 Republicanism, particularly to Wood, represented a 
bridge between traditional and modern society. One of its central tenets, a concern for 
the public good, was traditional, while at the same time it provided an impetus for the 
revolutionary ideology by encompassing democratic impulses. American society 
profoundly changed from a monarchical, hierarchical civilization of subjects to a liberal, 
democratic, commercial society of citizens. The Revolution “made the interests and 
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prosperity of ordinary people—their pursuits of happiness—the goal of society and 
government.”45 
Republicans also held that virtue meant disinterestedness and public-
spiritedness, coalescing around an understanding of civic virtue as concern for the 
public good. In turn, this meant anxiety for public figures like George Washington who 
were obsessed with the appearance of disinterestedness. Pocock would challenge the 
idea that Trenchard and Gordon were Lockean writers, instead locating them in the 
English country tradition, behind which James Harrington could be found and, before 
him, Niccolo Machiavelli.46 English country literature provided the colonists a critique of 
power and model of republicanism.47 The influence of Algernon Sidney’s Discourses 
Concerning Government, for instance, grew as Americans became discontented with 
Britain. Sidney, along with other republican writers like Frances Hutcheson, thought the 
people were sovereign and thus State sovereignty must be restricted so as to guard the 
liberties of the people. Americans came to recognize, then, that Britain’s demands on 
the colonies seemed to fly in the face of a limited sovereignty.48 Many Republicans 
looked to the ancient republics as a model of what to emulate and what to avoid: they 
should foster public virtue and private thrift while avoiding lapsing into the excesses of 
luxury.49 
This Republican ideology, and its failure to predict the impossibility of adhering to 
the public good “amidst a clamor of partial interests” facilitated the adoption of a 
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Constitution that, instead of “obviating conflict,” was designed with “the hope of 
managing and containing it.”50 It was out of the Constitution, then, that liberalism came 
to dominate the landscape of American ideology, with its focus on restraining 
governmental power and pitting partial interests against one another such that (one 
hoped) no one interest could come to dominate the others. The essence of the 
difference between the liberal and republican traditions was that the liberal tradition 
focused on “the state of nature, doctrine of consent, and [the] theory of natural rights,” 
while the republican tradition instead focused on “the ideas of mixed government, 
separation of powers, and a balanced constitution.”51 This contrast is difficult for many 
to parse today, especially since contemporary writers consider republicanism and 
liberalism, in the form described above, as part of the same tradition. Where the 
separation of the two traditions occurs most obviously is in the focus on character and 
public virtue in republicanism, which is relatively absent in liberalism. 
Joyce Appleby was a vocal critic of these republican historians who focused on 
the clashing ideologies erupting during the Revolution to the diminishment of the 
burgeoning market economy and the changing structure of society into a commercial 
one. It was these factors, according to Appleby, that made colonists predisposed to 
vigorously defending their freedoms against perceived threats of tyranny. America was 
becoming a very independent society around the middle of the century and to be 
dependent or unfree in such a situation was jarring compared to dependence or 
unfreedom in an interdependent society. This, to Appleby, provided more satisfying 
answers to why colonists reacted so strongly to tightening imperial restrictions and why 
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liberalism rose to prominence in the American mind.52 What distinguished liberalism and 
made liberalism, rather than republicanism, central to the Revolution were these ideas 
about commerce and economic liberty for which the republican tradition cannot 
account—productivity, spontaneous order, private self-interest leading to public benefit, 
and so forth.   
Appleby is on the right track when she argues that ideology is not enough to 
explain the American Revolution; what needs to be explained are why people came to 
their beliefs: “what compelled belief, what triggered reactions, what stirred passions, 
and what persuaded the colonists of the truth of their interpretation of events.”53 While it 
is undoubtedly true that Revolutionary ideology is crucial to understanding the origins of 
the American Revolution and the thought of the Revolutionaries, the effect of events on 
individuals that influences them toward a particular ideology is just as significant; 
indeed, events may also cause the ideas themselves to evolve or make way for new 
ideas to gain prominence. While Bailyn and others have done much work to explain 
what events leading up to the American Revolution influenced Americans to adopt their 
unique ideas and evolve the ideological landscape, less has been done on the 
alterations occurring during the American Revolution due to the events of the war. 
Members of Congress were on the front lines of debate and had substantial influence in 
this quasi-national role; hence, a study of members of Congress during the early years 
of the Continental Congress presents a logical entry point into the practical influence of 
ideology and its change over time. 
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The first question of the thesis is this: Can we actually track the changes in the 
dominant American ideology through an examination of the journals and debates of the 
Continental Congress through the Articles of Confederation? If so, then what changes in 
ideology can we examine directly or infer from these sources? Thirdly, how does the 
Revolutionary context shape these changing understandings about government and 
governance? 
In answer to the first question, yes, one can roughly track these changes in 
ideology, and the concern in this paper is to do so by parsing through the debates 
occurring during sessions of Congress that led to the adoption of specific resolutions. 
Secondly, although these changes can be tracked, to speak of a dominant ideology or 
American consensus would not do justice to the pluralistic ideological landscape of late 
eighteenth century American ideology. The period from 1774 to 1783 is best understood 
as a series of ideological peaks and troughs for both American liberalism and 
republicanism, fluctuating over time. This is because while we can point to the era of the 
Continental Congresses as one in which Revolutionaries were intent on the more 
utopian goals of obviating conflict altogether and choosing disinterested politicians 
whose chief concern was promoting the public good (republican), we can just as well 
point out that the period was one in which government was relatively small, unobtrusive, 
and decentralized in a more or less laissez-faire liberal fashion. It is also difficult to 
imagine much of the lofty, and more influential, revolutionary rhetoric of liberty and 
tyranny as reflecting something other than a liberal understanding; it was not that King 
George was tyrannical because he wasn’t disinterested enough to submerge his self-
interest and promote the public good, it was that the King was infringing on specific 
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economic liberties that were directly antithetical to liberal ideology. As such, we can 
definitively point to strong liberal concerns during to the lead up to Revolution, as well 
as in the Declaration of Independence (among other times).  
Undoubtedly, one can also find concerns that would appeal to Republican 
sentiments as well during the lead up to Revolution: concerns about corruption, 
understandings of the role of history and the British constitution, the balance and 
checking of the various interests or estates, etc. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that for many Revolutionaries, these stances were complementary; while 
they did, or would have, retreated into one domain or the other if push came to shove, 
any understanding of liberalism and classical republicanism that denies this 
complementarity for eighteenth century Americans is anachronistic. 
It was a confluence of events, more than any single event, that influenced 
evolving American thought; as Thomas Jefferson wrote,  it was “a long train of abuses” 
that impelled Congress to declare independence, and he was right. That said, it was the 
beginning of hostilities at Lexington and Concord that caused a seismic shift in 
Congress’ hopes and beliefs on reconciliation. Prior to the sitting of the First Congress, 
what the colonies called the “Intolerable Acts,” especially those that closed the port of 
Boston and reorganized the Massachusetts government, were the main cause for 
calling a Congress in the first place, and what Congress was dead-set on having 
repealed. 
Next, it was the false reports of bloodshed, the Powder Alarm, at the beginning of 
the First Congress, followed closely thereafter by the Suffolk Resolves, that shaped the 
direction of the First Congress, making sure their opposition would be staunch enough 
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not to concede to Britain. Once Congress had approved the Suffolk Resolves, it 
essentially committed itself to radical, rather than purely conciliatory, measures. 
Congress’ desire to, above all, stay unified meant an internal struggle to appeal 
to both the radical and conciliatory factions in Congress without acting too severely in 
either direction. This meant that when it came time for Congress to write a Declaration 
of Rights and Grievances, they included both natural law and the British constitution as 
their sources for their rights. It was also necessary from a reconciliatory standpoint 
because if they only argued for their rights on a foundation of natural law, it would have 
hurt their cause by being too radical and too far outside the British constitutional 
paradigm to be palatable to Britain. It was absolutely necessary to include British 
constitutionalism or risk total dismissal of their declarations and petitions. 
As the Second Congress rolled around, theory gave way to practical concerns for 
members of Congress n a day-to-day basis. Repeated failures of their first and second 
Petitions to the King made reconciliation appear hopeless, and independence the only 
viable option that could protect American rights. Repeated under-handed or cruel 
measures by Britain and their army made Congress see their relationship with Britain 
less as fraternal, a relationship worth saving, and instead saw Britain trying to be their 
master, using force and deceit to suppress the colonies, a relationship worth scrapping. 
Additionally, continued struggles by Congress to supply its army and militias with the 
necessary goods, because of shortages in supply they attributed to insufficient 
commitment to a wartime economy, meant Congress thought independence would 
obviate these issues. 
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All this led to May 1776, where Congress resolved that the states should set up 
their own independent governments. In doing this, Congress cemented the move 
toward independence, though this was only after all hopes had been dashed, war had 
been carried on for two year, and public opinion was as in favor of independence as 
they could ever expect. In this context came the Declaration of Independence, where 
members of Congress were only willing to oppose independence on grounds of 
prudence rather than principle; and in the Declaration was a synthesis of the thought of 
natural law and British constitutionalism that had evolved out of this necessity to 
compromise. 
2 THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774 
With France thoroughly defeated at the close of the Seven Years’ War, Britain 
began taxing the colonists to pay for a war that was fought primarily to defend North 
America from the French. More importantly than the new taxes, however, was that 
British minister George Grenville planned to enforce the tax collection strictly. The 
navigation acts had been on the books for a number of years, but with the new Sugar 
Act of 1764, enforcement of the tax began agitating colonial merchants, who were 
accustomed to the British policy of salutary neglect. They voiced a number of reasons 
for their protest, including an argument against taxation without representation, but 
ultimately they opposed the strict collection of any tax, and preferred to be asked to pay 
their share of the governmental burden, not have it demanded of them or taken by 
force.  
A Stamp Tax was subsequently passed by Parliament in March of 1765 that 
required the affixing of official stamps to nearly anything made out of paper, along with 
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other items, such as dice, which they had to purchase from colonial officials who would 
relay the money back to Britain. This provoked the loudest protest among the colonists, 
along with correspondingly increased complaints that this tax was in violation of the 
time-honored principles of English liberty, derived from the English Constitution, that 
prohibited the taxation of Englishmen without representation.54 The British rejected this 
due to their view that America had virtual representation in Parliament, since members 
of Parliament were said to represent every corner of Britain and its colonies, not the 
location from which they were elected. 
Patrick Henry and others urged resistance to the Stamp Act in the Virginia House 
of Burgesses, and soon a Stamp Act Congress met in New York on October 7, 1765, 
with representatives from nine of the thirteen colonies. They drew up a Declaration of 
Rights and Grievances to be presented to the King and Parliament in protest, 
reasserting the principle of no taxation without representation. The Declaration rejected 
virtual representation because of the remoteness of the colonies from the seat of power, 
and also rejected the admiralty court trials that had been called for under the Stamp Act 
in favor of the trial by jury.55  
The writs of assistance, another purported transgression by Great Britain, 
originated in the early 1760s. These were general warrants that permitted British 
officials to search the homes of colonists without a specific warrant, in order to find 
smuggled goods. This was a profound transgression on the rights of Englishmen, which 
asserted maintained the sanctity of a man’s home against government officials and all 
other unwanted trespassers unless there was individualized suspicion that was used to 
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obtain a warrant that would permit officials to search for evidence of a crime. While this 
affair had only a short duration, it signified the harbinger of deteriorating relations 
between Britain and the colonies to those looking back on the era,56 and such general 
warrants would later be prohibited by the 1787 Constitution, exhibiting their lasting 
significance to that era of Americans. 
The Townshend duties were also a cause of great mischief and misery in the 
colonies. The Townshend duties, beginning with the Revenue Act of 1767, were a 
series of acts that taxed colonial imports for the purposes of raising revenue. They 
reflected a change in the revenue-raising strategy of Britain, moving from the direct 
taxes to which the colonists objected, to the indirect import taxes. Their hopes were 
dashed as colonists objected on the more basic principle that they were getting taxed, 
without being represented in Parliament, for the purposes of raising revenue. The 
colonists felt that Britain could only requisition sums of money from the colonists, not 
demand it of them. They were all repealed in the Spring of 1770 except for the duty on 
tea, following the great calamity of the Boston Massacre. Unfortunately, leaving the 
direct tax on tea in place was problematic since this meant that Britain had rejected the 
basis of colonial grievances, despite the repeal of most of the taxes.57 
Committees of Correspondence would be launched as early as 1772 in 
Massachusetts, with Virginia following the next year, for the purposes of establishing 
channels of communication and coordinate a cohesive resistance, but they would have 
little influence or cohesion until 1774. In an essay titled “Observation” in the Boston 
Gazette, September 23, 1773, and reprinted at least thrice in other colonial 
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newspapers, the idea of a Congress was explored in detail, thus renewing interest 
among the colonies—and renewing the suspicions of Governor Thomas Hutchinson.58 
Colonial Resistance was renewed with opposition to the Tea Act of 1773, which 
attempted to revive the struggling British East India company by granting it a special 
license to export tea directly to North America while avoiding the Townshend tax on tea. 
This culminated in the Boston Tea Party on December 16, 1773 and a clear vision of 
the radical opposition during the new year to meet in Congress that summer. Britain 
would respond with the “Intolerable Acts” to punish the citizens of Massachusetts for the 
Tea Party, including the Boston Port Act, closing the port of Boston on June 1, 1774. 
The Boston Town meeting then resolved upon a nonconsumption agreement against 
British goods, which was problematic for colonial merchants who generally wanted to 
resume trade relations. Their opposition failed, as they were vastly outnumbered in 
sentiments by the general population.59 As 1774 rolled around, Parliament’s authority to  
make laws for America was the primary issue dividing Americans from the British—
surpassing the issue of Parliament’s ability to enact revenue-raising taxes on American 
colonists—as the delegates to the First Continental Congress headed off to Philadelphia 
at the end of the summer.60 
The First Continental Congress met in Philadelphia during the months of 
September and October 1774. This Congress was markedly different than later 
Congresses, whose debates were dominated by efforts to manage the war, whether 
through raising troops, moving them, paying for them, promoting them, or procuring 
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supplies for them. The efforts of the First Congress were very outward-facing, that is, 
concerned with the international repercussions of their actions; primarily they were 
concerned with how their actions appeared to the British government and British people, 
but they also wanted to be viewed as having a just cause for opposing British 
measures.  
At this point, most members of Congress and the bulk of the American people 
wanted to avoid war and avoid escalating the conflict, which could lead to war. Yet, they 
also wanted to maintain peace while securing their liberties, which was a delicate 
balance in which neither side wanted to give ground. As best as it could have hoped, 
without capitulating to Britain’s demands to pay for the tea and to accept Britain’s right 
to bind the colonies in all cases, Congress stood its ground and produced a radical, but 
restrained series of resolutions that did not concede much to Britain, but also did not 
question British authority in the ways radicals might have wanted. 
2.1 Delegate Authorizations 
          On September 5, 1774, delegates assembled at Carpenter’s Hall in Philadelphia, 
unanimously electing Peyton Randolph of Virginia as its president for its first act, with 
Charles Thomson chosen as Secretary.61 The President would sign documents, serve 
as Congress’s de facto spokesman, and “serve as its social and diplomatic 
representative.”62  The Congress then provided the credentials of every delegate, which 
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included the scope of their authority to act on behalf of their respective colonies. It is 
important to examine these authorizations because it indicates the intentions of colonial 
representatives and how they understood the future and continuing role of Congress in 
the emerging crisis. From Congress to Congress, it thus provides important reference 
points as to the sentiments of American colonists throughout the conflict and how they 
changed. 
New Hampshire’s two delegates were chosen at Exeter by eighty-five Deputies 
appointed by several towns in New Hampshire “to devise, consult, and adopt” 
measures, as well as “to restore that Peace, Harmony, and mutual Confidence, which 
once happily subsisted between the Parent Country and her Colonies.” The theme of 
consulting and deliberating in the delegates’ authorizations was the most common 
feature of all colonial authorizations, being present in nearly every one. Likewise, the 
express purpose of restoring peace and harmony with Britain featured prominently in 
four of the delegates’ credentials (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Maryland). New Hampshire’s authorization also instructed its delegates to “devise, 
consult, and adopt such Measures, as may…secure and perpetuate their Rights 
Liberties, and Privileges,” which was common to four other colonial instructions 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hancock himself. An additional secretary followed not long after. Eventually, on November 19, 
1777, provision was made for the president—then Henry Laurens—of 1000 dollars to pay 
expenses incurred by the President of the Congress. Even so, the financial burdens were still 
immense, even for a man of wealth like Laurens. It was only with the impending arrival of a 
minister from the Court of Versailles in 1778 that it was recommended that Congress provide a 
“House and Table” for the President to entertain ministers; even then, nothing came of the 
recommendation. Once John Jay succeeded Laurens, however, Congress began taking steps 
to relieve the unusually heavy financial burden from the shoulders of the President; Edmund C. 
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(Pennsylvania, Maryland, North Carolina, and Rhode Island).63 The language “adopt 
measures” in the New Hampshire instructions was significant since it was the only one 
to do so other than Pennsylvania. According to their instructions, the delegates could 
“adopt such Measures” for three purposes:  
[T]o extricate the Colonies from their present Difficulties; to secure and 
perpetuate their Rights, Liberties, and Privileges, and to restore that Peace, 
Harmony, and mutual Confidence, which once happily subsisted between the 
Parent Country and her Colonies.64  
Similarly, Massachusetts authorized its delegates to “determine upon wise and proper 
measures [emphasis added]” (as did Pennsylvania), and North Carolina authorized 
them to “take” measures, but it is not clear whether this was the technical equivalent of 
“adopting” measures, with its implication that Congress might have some law-making 
authority.65  
Rhode Island’s two delegates were chosen on August 10, 1774, by their General 
Assembly in order that they begin: 
consulting upon proper Measures to obtain a repeal of the several Acts of 
the British Parliament for levying Taxes upon his Majesty’s Subjects in 
America, without their consent, and particularly an Act lately passed for 
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64 Pennsylvania’s use of adopt is slightly different than New Hampshire’s because New 
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65 Ibid., 1:3. The possibility remains that even if the delegations gave their 
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blocking up the Port of Boston, and upon proper Measures to establish the 
Rights and Liberties of the Colonies upon a just and solid Foundation.66 
Here was the emergence of another theme that was common to many of the 
instructions (Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South 
Carolina), namely that they sought the repeal of Acts of Parliament or redress of the 
grievances stemming from these acts. More significant was that Rhode Island made the 
issue of consent a centerpiece in their condemnation of Parliamentary taxation. 
Unfortunately, the instructions do not intimate what was the solid foundation for 
American rights.  
 Maryland’s five delegates were chosen between June 22 and June 25, 1774 in 
Annapolis, any two or more of whom were capable of serving as deputies in the 
Congress. Their charge was “to effect one general Plan of Conduct, operating on the 
Commercial Connection of the Colonies with the Mother Country, for the relief of 
Boston, and preservation of American Liberty.”67 Their instructions were ambiguous as 
to how wide was their grant of authority, but we can see the instructions reflected the 
familiar purpose of redressing American grievances against Britain and intrusions on 
American liberty. More importantly, Maryland expressly indicated that the purpose of 
Congress was to foster unity among the colonies, which was a major concern among 
members of Congress. 
 In the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly, on August 2, 1774, five 
deputies were appointed to Congress in order that they consider the recently passed 
Parliamentary acts that reorganized the constitution of Massachusetts and closed the 
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port of Boston, as well as the taxes Great Britain imposed on the colonies to raise 
revenue. They invested their delegates  
with full power and authority to concert, agree to, and affectually [sic] 
prosecute such legal Measures, as in the Opinion of the said Deputies, 
and of the Deputies so to be assembled, shall be most likely to obtain a 
Repeal of the said Acts, and a Redress of those Grievances. 
South Carolina’s instructions were the most lengthy of all the instructions, and 
arguably represented the strongest delegation of authority by a colony. It 
forcefully articulated that the delegates had “full power and authority” to adopt 
measures, but also to “affectually [sic] prosecute….legal measures,” meaning 
South Carolina would treat Congressional measures as binding law—perhaps it 
even signified it would be permissible for Congress to enforce its measures itself. 
The deputies from North Carolina arrived late at Congress and produced their 
credentials on September 14.68 The delegates from North Carolina were chosen at 
Newbern on August 25, 1774 at a general meeting of deputies in the colony, with the 
resolution that they: 
deliberate upon the present State of British America, and to take such 
Measures as they may deem prudent to effect the Purpose of describing 
with Certainty the Rights of Americans, repairing the Breach made in 
those Rights, and for guarding them for the Future from any such 
Violations done under the Sanction of public Authority….and they are 
hereby invested with such Powers, as may make any Acts done by them 
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or Consent given in behalf of this Province, obligatory in Honour upon 
every Inhabitant hereof.69 
North Carolina, too, delegated muscular authority to their colonial 
representatives, investing them with “Powers” to agree to acts that would be 
obligatory on every North Carolinian.70  
 What can we conclude by looking at the instructions of authority and by the 
variety of means in which deputies were appointed in their home colonies (and 
counties)? Over a century ago, Claude H. van Tyne concluded that “If the instructions to 
Congress meant anything, the delegates came together unauthorized by the people to 
act as a national government.”71 The evidence bears out this interpretation. In general, 
the authorizations were dominated by purposes—practical problems for which the 
colonies hoped Congress could provide solutions. This context explains the otherwise 
diverse language of the instructions. The greatest commonality among them was the 
authority to consult, consider, devise, or deliberate upon measures the colonies should 
carry out in unison, to achieve the greatest effect. Even when instructions authorized 
colonial delegates to “adopt,” “take,” or “determine upon” measures, the grant of 
representative authority is murky because we cannot tell whether they would consider 
Congressional measures binding and thus enforceable on the colonies. In addition, a 
number of the delegates were not representatives of the whole provinces, but specific 
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counties. Some, like James Duane, were unsure whether they represented their 
counties or the whole province of New York.72  
2.2 Resolutions: Forging a Compromise 
For the most part, the authorizations did not provide any guidance as to what 
was the proper foundation of American rights, or on what grounds Britain’s late acts 
concerning Boston and Massachusetts, as well as its taxation of the colonies, were 
illegal or unconstitutional. The strongest thing we can glean from the authorizations is 
that when the colonists consistently opposed instances of British taxation, it was on the 
grounds of consent. Consent to taxation was grounded in the ancient constitution, but to 
invoke it against parliament (the body which the ancient constitution granted authority to 
tax) suggested that the colonists were thinking in terms of social contract theory. If 
those with a stake in Parliamentary legislation i.e. property-holders, were not permitted 
real representation through which their interests could be contended, the colonists were 
not bound to obey the laws it dictated, or so many Americans thought, like members of 
Congress Samuel Ward and John Adams.73 Even loyalist member of Congress Joseph 
Galloway took a very radical position on the issue of consent. He argued that the people 
of America could be bound by law enacted prior to coming to America, but only bound 
by future law with their consent—what Galloway considered the essence of the British 
constitution. It was just that Galloway saw the American colonies as essentially 
consenting through silence over the course of one hundred and fifty years, through to 
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the middle of the eighteenth century.74  Ward, on the other hand, rejected the idea that 
the colonies had consented through acquiescence because he saw plenty of complaints 
throughout the period; plus, Ward said, just because Americans have submitted to the 
injuries and oppressions of Parliament, out of prudence, force, or fear of force, did not 
justify those acts of Parliament: “The great Grotius justly says Quod ab initio injustum 
est nullo potest fieri modo aut usu justum aut rectum. That is whatever is originally 
wrong in its own Nature cannot be santifyed[sic] or made right by Repetition & Use.”75 
This understanding harkened back to liberal social contract theory, which was 
disliked by some constitutionalists who saw no historical basis for a social contract, nor 
anything about man’s nature that meant government necessarily must be founded on 
the basis of consent. At the same time, the understanding that one of the cornerstones 
of the British constitution was the belief that consent made Parliamentary legislation 
binding was deeply rooted in American and British constitutional thought. Consent was 
not the be-all and end-all for all of Britain’s right to regulate trade; it could be grounded 
in “Compact, Acquiescence, Necessity, Protection.” Both Galloway and Duane argued 
that necessity was an important condition for Britain’s right to regulate trade, thinking 
that there had to be a supreme will that could legislate, and thus regulate trade. 
Galloway also believed that everyone thought Britain could regulate trade as a matter of 
reciprocity. If Britain protected the sea routes, Americans were liable to pay them taxes 
to support this. Practical concerns often dominated their discussions as well, since a 
number of members argued that to deny Britain’s undisputed right to regulate trade 
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would make it look like they were aiming at independence, which was universally 
undesirable.76 
This overlapping of the two traditions made their synthesis palatable to 
Congress, which did not want to commit itself to a single philosophical position. This 
practical position allowed colonists to keep open avenues of reconciliation or redress 
that might otherwise have been closed for the sake of ideological consistency. In doing 
this, Congress unwittingly interlocked the two traditions together and made this fusion 
appear to be the “official” position that unified Americans, even though individuals within 
and without Congress had reservations about either the common law or natural law as 
the strongest foundation. 
If Americans had a common set of assumptions, as many have argued, tying 
seemingly disparate strands of thought together, those assumptions were set out prior 
to the Revolution, forged during the Revolution, and solidified as the Revolution closed 
and the U.S. Constitution was crafted. By being the de facto spokesman for unified 
America, both the British and Americans had to take seriously the ties expressed by 
Congress between the common law and natural law. While Congress’s scope was far 
broader than the single issue of how to ground American rights, and thus comprises 
many debates and resolutions that don’t say much about the topic, it is important to 
incorporate much of this as part of the narrative because these other debates were 
themselves part of the context in which members of Congress has to navigate when 
forming and sharing their ideas.  
                                               
76 John Adams’ Diary, October 13, 1774, in Smith, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 
1:189; James Duane, Notes for a Speech in Congress, October 13, 1774, in Smith, Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 1:189-191; John Adams, Notes of Debates, September 28, 1774, in 
Smith, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1:109-112. 
 
 
 
42 
Members of Congress also came together with a number of practical 
assumptions. None came to Congress hoping for war. All came expecting to promote 
conciliation, rather than independence. All felt Britain had exceeded its constitutional 
rights of legislation, though members differed in the particulars, i.e., how far and how 
many recent acts exceeded Parliamentary authority. All knew what was at stake if their 
actions were perceived as aggressive, insolent, or aiming at independence. Where 
members of Congress disagreed was the ultimate source of their rights. Their 
differences would continue throughout the Revolution, but it was not these private 
differences that had lasting influence, but their public compromises that shaped 
succeeding generations and their understandings of the war. Bringing in ideas from 
natural law into a nation’s core dialogue and having a foundational influence was the 
creative and novel result, with great implications. 
In some cases, differences were substantial. Richard Henry Lee came to 
Congress with the goal of getting Britain to repeal nearly everything and redressing 
American grievances, which he thought Congress could do by crafting a resolution 
against Britain. Now was the time to make “vigorous exertions,” he thought; the 
Navigation Acts, however, should not be disputed, since it would strike at the heart of 
the British empire, which depended on the benefits accruing from these acts. It would 
have easily united the British against America.77 Patrick Henry, on the other hand, 
called the Navigation Acts “a Capital Violation,” and presumably wanted the colonists to 
strike at them too.78 Early in the proceedings, Henry rose to declare that America was 
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dissolved into one mass by the tyranny of the British, but he would be rebutted by John 
Jay who denied any pretensions that the Congress was there to “frame an American 
Constitution.” Instead, Congress was there to fix the problems created by Parliament.   
One of the Rutledge’s (Edward or John) also said that representatives to Congress 
“have no legal Authority….no coercive or legislative authority,” denying that members of 
Congress were a government, had the power to frame a government, or could act with 
the authority of a government.79 Henry’s opinion was undoubtedly a minority one, as it 
asserted the de facto independence of the American colonies, which Congressional 
resolutions would continuously deny until 1776. It was an appearance to the world that 
members of Congress were desirous to avoid.  
Certain events brought about substantial shifts both in Congressional resolutions 
and private sentiments of Congressman that helped forge a compromise and shape the 
direction of the war. The currents causing this shift were not strong enough to have a 
lasting and irreversible significance until mid-1776, at which point Congress issued the 
Declaration of Independence, a showcase in the fusion of British constitutionalism and 
natural law thinking. This fusion was forged out of the necessity of compromise in a 
fragile political situation, in which Congress bridled thoughts of invoking the radical 
solution of independence until the prospect of reconciliation became inconceivable. The 
major events that precipitated this sea change were, first, General Gage’s seizure of 
munitions at Quarry Hill on September 1st, 1774 (known as the Powder Alarm), where 
there were false reports of fighting and bloodshed, in which members of Congress 
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wanted revenge and were willing to turn Congress “into a Council of War” if the news 
was true,80 followed shortly thereafter by the Suffolk Resolves which were approved of 
by Congress on September 17th. After this, the next important event was the Battle of 
Lexington and Concord in April, 1775 , after which Congress felt a long, bloody conflict 
was inevitable. 
The Powder Alarm was significant because it shocked the Congress, and gave 
their business increasing solemnity and urgency, which made Congress more favorably 
disposed to defensive preparation and radical measures. Even when the reports proved 
to be exaggerated, as Gage’s men had only taken charge of gunpowder at Cambridge 
without bloodshed, the genie could not be put back in the bottle. Congress still took this 
as an aggressive assertion of power by Gage that exemplified an escalation of the 
situation in Boston.81  
 There were two important compromises in the Continental Congress’s 
Declaration of Rights and Grievances: first, in the decision to couch American rights in 
terms of British constitutionalism and natural rights; second, in the compromise between 
moderate and radical factions in Congress, though the rhetoric and provisions were 
skewed toward the radical faction. But none in the radical faction could be wholly 
pleased; every time a Patrick Henry or a Richard Henry Lee submitted a proposal, his 
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plans were watered down substantially.82 For instance, in the Petition to the King, Henry 
and Lee each submitted draft petitions, only to have John Dickinson, a late addition to 
the Committee on Rights and Grievances, write a new draft that would serve as the 
template for the final petition.83 In the Address To The People of Great Britain, Lee 
drafted an eight-page draft which had little bearing on the final draft, written by John 
Jay, aside from a single sentence of Lee’s draft that was copied verbatim and included 
in the final address.84 In addition, a draft of the Letter to Thomas Gage, written by 
Samuel Adams in a tone of asperity, was recommitted by Congress, likely because 
Congress wanted a less inflammatory letter. The final letter that was approved was 
rhetorically more in line with John Adams’s draft letter to Gage, with much more 
subdued tone.85 On the whole, Richard Henry Lee’s influence on major resolutions of 
the First Continental Congress, along with other radicals like Patrick Henry, remained 
secondary to more moderate representatives, such as John Dickinson (despite his late 
appearance) and even James Duane, even though the resolutions themselves would be 
closer to the views of the radicals.  
 There were undoubtedly factions who can broadly be described as for or against 
invoking natural law as the grounding of American rights, with argument on this topic 
throughout the First Congress. John Rutledge, Joseph Galloway, James Duane, and 
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Silas Deane each spoke against natural law, or omitted it as a source of American 
rights. Rutledge argued that the British constitution provided firmer ground for their 
rights than natural law. Galloway said that rights derived from living in political society, 
not from the state of nature. On September 8th, Duane called the natural law a “feeble 
support” for American rights, compared to the British constitution and colonial 
charters.86 On other occasions, Duane listed three sources for American rights (the 
English common law and ancient statutes, colonial charters, and provincial laws), 
ignoring natural law altogether.87 
 On the other hand, John Jay, Patrick Henry Richard Henry Lee, and John Adams 
each spoke on behalf of including natural law as one, if not the most basic or solid, of 
the foundations of American rights. Henry described a “fourfold foundation,” with natural 
law included among the British constitution, colonial charters, and “immemorial Usage.” 
Lee called the natural law “the broadest Bottom,” for American rights. Jay argued that 
the colonies must refer to both natural law and the British constitution for their rights. 
Adams pointed out that the colonies needed to be able to rely on the laws of nature if 
they were driven to it by England; as such, Adams recalled that he “was very strenuous 
for retaining and insisting upon it.”88  
On September 5, Congress debated the method of voting, with the largest 
colonies promoting a distribution of votes based on population or “interests,” but it was 
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resolved the next day that each colony should have one vote because of the difficulty of 
ascertaining the necessary information to apportion votes in some other fashion.89 In 
addition, each colony had the option of postponing a vote (on some issue debated that 
day) to another day, which was a strong provision for states in a minority on any issue. 
Delegates at the Convention also resolved to keep their proceedings secret until the 
Congress approved making their proceedings public. Additionally, they resolved to 
appoint two committees, one to declare the rights of the colonies, their grievances, and 
the means of redress, and the other to examine the trade restriction statutes affecting 
the colonies.90  
Then, on September 7, after church service and receiving prayer, Congress 
divvied up the delegates into committees, voting that the Committee on Rights should 
consist of two delegates from each colony, while the Committee on Trade and 
Manufactures should consist of a single delegate from each colony.91 Throughout its 
deliberations, the committee on rights argued whether natural rights, colonial charters, 
or the British constitution should serve as the fundamental basis of their colonial rights, 
ultimately opting for a compromise that drew on each tradition. The committee on trade 
and manufacturing was tasked with establishing a list of British trade restrictions and 
manufacturing restrictions that were unjust and harmed the colonists, ultimately leading 
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to a resolution by the Congress to boycott British goods and form the Continental 
Association. 
On September 17, Congress approved the Suffolk Resolves, committing itself to 
a radical posture towards Britain—radical in their “forthright commitment to a program of 
resistance.” Containing harsh rhetoric against tyrannous Britain, the resolves came out 
of Massachusetts opposition to the Government Act, which by British fiat reorganized 
the Massachusetts government. It should be noted that the Suffolk Resolves were able 
to receive unanimous support in the Congress because the measures it adopted were 
much less radical than its rhetorical flourishes. They did not, for instance, design to 
provoke battle with General Gage’s men. The Resolves instead approved of massive 
civil disobedience by disregarding anything done by the newly organized provincial 
government and preventing it from carrying out its functions. The approval of the 
Resolves by Congress was substantial because it was Congress’s first public act, 
meant to show Congress’s solidarity with Massachusetts and broadcast to the world 
that Congress also would not go beyond a defensive posture aimed at repeal of the 
offending acts.92 Once it made its first public act, Congress could not go back and take 
a more conservative line toward Britain. 
 Congress would unanimously resolve on September 22 to boycott British goods 
for the time being, until further consideration.93 On September 27, after a day of debate, 
the Congress resolved unanimously to ban importation from Great Britain and Ireland 
starting December 1st.94 Following up this resolution to stop importing British goods was 
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a non-exportation agreement resolved on September 30 banning exportation of all 
goods to Great Britain, Ireland, and the West Indies.95 
The next day, the Congress resolved unanimously to prepare a petition of 
grievances to the Crown “entreating his Majesty’s gracious Interposition for the Removal 
of such Grievances; thereby to restore between Great-Britain and the Colonies that 
Harmony so necessary to the Happiness of the British Empire, and so ardently desired 
by all America," which would be prepared by Richard Henry Lee, John Adams, Thomas 
Johnson, Patrick Henry, and John Rutledge. These men were instructed to assure the 
king that the colonists had every intention of paying their due expenses to support the 
government and the administration of justice, as well as rely on their own militias in time 
of war. These provisions were in clear reference to the taxes that had been placed on 
America following the French and Indian War, as well as the fact that the British army 
helped the colonists fight their campaign against the French. They wanted to assure the 
King that he didn’t need to support the colonists so heavily in future wars, and make it a 
point that the colonists would pay requisitions gladly; they didn’t need to be taxed to 
pay, nor did they need the British army to occupy the colonies in order to do so. On 
October 5, they added further instructions to the committee to assure the King that if the 
offending acts were repealed—the “Intolerable Acts”—they promised to restore 
commerce with Great Britain.96 
On Friday, October 7, the Congress resolved that they prepare a letter to 
General Gage to express their horror that: 
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while the Congress are deliberating on the most peaceable Means for 
restoring American Liberty, and that Harmony and Intercourse...his 
Excellency [General Gage], as they are informed, is raising Fortifications 
round the Town of Boston, thereby exciting well grounded Jealousies in 
the Minds of his Majesty’s faithful Subjects therein, that he means to cut 
off all Communication between them and their Brethren in the Country, 
and reduce them to a State of Submission to his Will.97  
The letter was their attempt to reach out to Gage and thereby prevent “the Horrors of a 
civil War,” and was no doubt connected to the earlier Powder Alarm, the Suffolk 
Resolves, and other news of Boston and Massachusetts floodingcin daily. They further 
resolved the next day that they approved of Massachusetts’ opposition to the Intolerable 
Acts, saying “and if the same shall be attempted to be carried into execution by Force, 
in such case, all America ought to support them in their Opposition.” Here, one should 
notice that their resolution was not that they will go to war, or direct America into war, 
should Gage lay siege to Boston, but that all of America ought to go to war and support 
Massachusetts in such a situation.  
Using similar language to their approval of the conduct of Massachusetts, on 
October 10, the Congress unanimously resolved that “in case the Provincial Meeting of 
that Colony [Massachusetts] should judge it absolutely necessary [to remove the 
citizens of Boston into the country], it is the Opinion of the Congress, that all America 
ought to contribute towards recompencing [sic] them for the Injury they may thereby 
sustain.”98 Not only this, but they resolved unanimously: 
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That every Person and Persons whomsoever, who shall take, accept, or 
act under any Commission or Authority, in any-wise derived from the Act 
passed in the last Session of Parliament, changing the Form of 
Government, and violating the Charter of the Province of Massachusetts 
Bay, ought to be held in Detestation and Abhorrence by all good Men, and 
considered as the wicked Tools of that Despotism, which is preparing to 
destroy those Rights, which God, Nature and Compact, have given to 
America.99 
When referring to those who violated the Massachusetts charter as “tools of despotism” 
who ought to be held in detestation and abhorrence, they did not even say that they 
ought to be subjected to legal sanction, let alone that the Congress itself had the power 
to legally sanction those who are prepared to violate Americans’ fundamental rights. As 
an extralegal body, it was important for Congress to continually maintain this reality and 
not impinge the authority of the colonies, nor act so broadly that they were assumed to 
be denying Parliament or the King’s legitimate authority. Importantly, natural rights was 
making its way into the resolutions of Congress, as this was an early example of the 
synthesis of natural rights and constitutionalism taking shape. 
 Shortly thereafter, on October 11th, a letter to Thomas Gage, drafted by a 
Committee consisting of Edmund Pendleton, Samuel Adams, and Thomas Lynch, was 
signed by President Peyton Randolph on behalf of the Congress. The letter denounced 
the apparent plan of Gage to subjugate the residents of Boston, a plan that would 
undermine the prospects of reconciliation that Americans desired. They then resolved 
that the residents of the Massachusetts colony should do their best to maintain the 
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peace with Gage, only engaging the British if it was absolutely necessary to their own 
safety and defense.  
The Continental Congress, on October 14th, adopted a Declaration of Rights and 
Grievances that had been drafted by the committee on rights and grievances. This 
document set out their rights and relationship to Britain, set forth their grievances, and 
submitted the ways in which their grievances could be redressed, which was the form 
the Declaration of Independence would later take in 1776.100 The familiar grievances 
included: that judges were made dependent on the king for their salaries; the king kept 
standing armies in the colonies during peacetime; colonists were transported to England 
for crimes committed in the colonies; the king dissolved their assemblies and ignored 
their humble petitions; and more. This Declaration stated that each colony severally 
elected and appointed its own members (“deputies”) “in order to obtain such 
establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties, may not be subverted.” Thus, 
“The good People of the Several Colonies,” which were then individually listed, 
assembled “in a full and free representation of these Colonies” in order to prevent 
further subversion of their rightful sphere of autonomy. The colonists believed it was 
part of the ancient tradition of English liberties to declare their rights, hence they set 
forward eleven resolutions on the basis of natural law, “the principles of the English 
constitution, and the several charters or compacts” of the colonies.101 What follows are 
some notable resolutions: 
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Resolved, N.C.D.1. That they are entitled to life, liberty and property, and 
they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to 
dispose of either without their consent. 
... 
Resolved, 4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free 
government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative 
council: and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their 
local and other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the 
British parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of 
legislation in their several provincial legislatures. . . .subject only to the 
negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used 
and accustomed. But, from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the 
mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of 
such acts of the British parliament, as are bonfide, restrained to the 
regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the 
commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and 
the commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea 
of taxation internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects, in 
America, without their consent. 
... 
Resolved, 10. It is indispensably necessary to good government, and 
rendered essential by the English constitution, that the constituent 
branches of the legislature be independent of each other; that, therefore, 
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the exercise of legislative power in several colonies, by a council 
appointed, during pleasure, by the crown, is unconstitutional, dangerous 
and destructive to the freedom of American legislation.102 
 With resolution one, there was the liberal life, liberty, and property formulation 
derived from John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,103 affirming the sovereignty of 
the people, rather than the distant sovereignty of the King or Parliament. This 
formulation would be changed by Thomas Jefferson to read Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness in the Declaration of Independence. It asserted that they were free 
men, not subject to the whims of arbitrary government.  Likewise, it made reference to 
the tradition of English constitutionalism, under which the legitimacy of Parliament 
derived from the consent of the citizens given through real representation. 
Resolution four was a vivid recitation of what the colonies were rebelling against 
but also what they were not. They were not revolting against taxation per se, but 
taxation for the purposes of raising revenue without their consent through 
representation. This was one of two resolutions that were not unanimously approved, as 
it did not satisfy conservatives who thought the Navigation Acts were justified and 
thought Britain had expansive authority over the colonies to regulate trade. The task of 
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moderates like Joseph Galloway, who wanted to be as conciliatory as possible toward 
Britain, was made difficult because they had difficulty arguing that a total power of 
Britain over the colonies was unlikely to be exercised and would not be dangerous to 
the colonies, practically speaking, since the Intolerable Acts were still in force and, to 
Americans, were an example of total, tyrannous power being exercised on a colony.104 
In addition, the Galloway Plan of Union, proposed September 28th by the moderate 
Galloway to head off discussions of trade sanctions against Britain, itself represented a 
radical departure from the status quo, recommending the formation of an extra-colonial 
body that would regulate the trade of the colonies instead of Britain. The creation of an 
American Parliament itself could suggest the colonies were on a path toward 
independence because it would be a substitute for Parliamentary regulation of trade, 
even though it would have more ties to Britain than did colonial legislatures. 
Additionally, even moderates like Galloway promoting such a proposal gave credence 
to the issue of colonial consent in matters of taxation, even though the proposal did not 
directly rebuke Parliament. Nonetheless, in the Declaration, Congress did not deny 
Parliament the right to regulate trade, but granted it as a matter of practical interest and 
consent, rather than as a matter of right, as James Duane wanted.105 While this 
resolution adopted some of the language of conservative James Duane, it narrowly 
tailored British authority to regulate trade only to justify external regulations that were for 
the good of the whole empire, including the colonies themselves, and even then it said 
that the colonists consented to this out of necessity, not because Parliament had the 
right to do so. The Declaration, along with other major outputs of the Committee on 
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Rights and Grievances, also skirted the issue of paying the British back for the tea they 
destroyed, another blow against the possibility that the Americans would take the first 
step toward conciliatory measures. 
Resolution ten illustrated the emerging consensus favoring the separation of 
powers in order to prevent combinations between the branches against the public, a 
major, distinct focus of classical republican thinkers, which would later be 
institutionalized in the Constitution. While this was clearly an important grievance 
against Britain, which they saw as the cause of Parliamentary corruption, it was one of 
the many colonial grievances, and should not be given undue weight that would 
undermine a pluralistic understanding of American thought during the Revolution. 
This declaration represented the product of a month’s debate in the Committee 
on Rights and Grievances between the radical elements, like Richard Henry Lee, who 
proposed grounding British opposition in natural law, and the more conservative 
elements, like Joseph Galloway, who sought “firmer” grounds in the English 
Constitution, law, and colonial charters. In it, we see an affirmation of all three as 
sources of the colonists’ rights and liberties, placating all constituencies, while avoiding 
both an extreme loyalist position, that recognized Parliamentary authority in all matters, 
and an extreme radical position, that recognized no Parliamentary authority whatever.106 
Before the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of Rights and Grievances of 
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1774 represented the best example of the fusion of natural law and British 
constitutionalism as a means to ground American rights and secure redress from 
Britain. In addition to the preamble, resolution five unanimously resolved that the 
colonists were “entitled to the common law of England,” more evidence of Congress 
drawing substantially from both traditions. 
Following these resolutions, they declared a substantial number of Parliamentary 
Acts to be unconstitutional or otherwise against the law. At the conclusion of their 
declaration they resolved to do three things: to boycott British goods, to prepare an 
address to British inhabitants in Great-Britain and British America, and to prepare an 
address pledging their loyalty to the King.107 
 The Galloway Plan of Union, introduced to Congress on September 28, 1774 by 
the arch Tory Joseph Galloway, was an attempt to mitigate looming conflict and 
preserve the relations of the colonies with Great Britain, featuring “a colonial president-
general appointed by the Crown, a colonial grand council of representatives elected by 
the various colonial assemblies, and a veto power by both the colonial grand council 
and the British Parliament over imperial regulations which affected the American 
colonies.” The plan failed because it essentially placed the blame for the crisis on 
colonial overreaction, rather than British overreach, in its grant of a Parliamentary 
veto.108 Although not extremely popular, opposed by Lee and Henry in particular, it was 
supported by James Duane, John Jay, and Edward Rutledge. Henry said that this would 
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only extend the influence of corruption further onto American soil. “Bribery is a Part of 
her [Britain’s] System of Government,” he said, and the creation of an American 
legislature would give Britain the chance to bribe the American legislature as well. 
Furthermore, it still would not grant consent because the legislature would be composed 
of representatives of representatives. Lee said that he was not empowered to decide 
the question of an American legislature because it had the potential to alter colonial 
constitutions. Jay argued that a colonial parliament would not necessarily violate any 
rights or liberties, or impinge on the colonial constitutions. Duane thought this was a 
good plan for permanent fraternal relations with Britain. Rutledge said “it [was] almost a 
perfect Plan,” that could provide a basis for “permanent Relief” of the colonies.109 
Galloway’s plan was introduced during debate on non-importation on September 28th, 
as an attempt to step around the question of Parliamentary authority, as well as bypass 
the need for economic measures against Britain, but was recommitted for further debate 
after a 6-5 vote (with one colony divided). This plan to create a lasting basis of British 
and colonial relations was unsuccessful, and eventually erased from the record of the 
Continental Congress by order of the Congress on October 22, after most of the work of 
Congress was done and Galloway’s Plan was incongruous with what Congress has 
already accomplished.110 It is notable that such a plan was designed to create an 
overarching government over the colonies with a colonial grand council, meaning the 
First Congress was not a legislative body as such.  
 Galloway’s proposal had interrupted debate on economic issues, such as 
whether the colonies should pay for tea, whether they should enact non-importation and 
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non-exportation agreements, and if so, what should they ban and when should the ban 
begin. There was great diversity of opinion on this subject that defies easy 
categorization, although most members of Congress favored non-importation and/or 
non-exportation to some degree. Some, like Robert Treat Paine, thought banning 
flaxseed to Ireland was crucial because of its indirect effect on England through Ireland, 
while others did not want Ireland or other locations outside of mainland Britain to be 
harmed, particularly those within the British empire.111 Others, like Samuel Chase and 
Edmund Pendleton were against a non-importation agreement against dutied articles 
because an importer would have no way of knowing whether a duty was paid or not.112 
A number of members, including Isaac Low, Pendleton, George Ross, and Duane 
thought the colonies should pay for the tea as a conciliatory gesture, which would be 
necessary to repeal the Intolerable Acts, while Henry, Lee, Gadsden, Thomas Lynch, 
Rutledge, John Adams, Samuel Ward, Robert Goldsborough, and Rutledge Jr. opposed 
this measure.113 
After considering the plans proposed by each committee, on October 12 the 
committee delivered the plan for the Continental Association. From October 15th to 
October 20th, the Congress debated the plan of association for boycotting British 
goods, which was finally agreed to after “being debated by Paragraphs and sundry 
Amendments made” on October 20th. The Continental Association listed the colonies 
severally, and addressed the King, blaming the current debacle on the “ruinous System 
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of Colony Administration adopted by the British Ministry about the Year 1763.” It listed 
the grievances the colonists had against Britain which had become familiar by this time, 
including the Intolerable Acts. Their solution, the association maintained, was to enact a 
non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation policy against British goods, 
refusing to deal with the British commercially.114 
Many states took up the call. New Hampshire circulated a document among the 
people of their colony which they would sign, thereby subscribing in covenant to 
“Suspension of all commercial Intercourse with the Island of Great-Britain.” The New 
Hampshire Non-Importation agreement cited the abominable closure of Boston Harbor. 
Pledgers agreed to cease commerce until Britain repealed its taxes on the colonies 
without representation, instead opting for autarky. It was a voluntary adoption of 
boycotting by individuals and groups within the colony itself, rather than the state as a 
whole, with lists of individual subscribers signing the document itself. To the extent that 
the colonies adopted a boycott of British goods, it was not because of Congressional 
command, but colonial command, local command, or voluntary endorsement.115 
The fifth article of the agreement made it appear more ambiguous as to whether 
it was a command. It said “Such as are Merchants, and use the British and Irish Trade, 
will give Orders [emphasis added], as soon as possible, to their Factors, Agents, and 
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Correspondents, in Great-Britain and Ireland, not to ship any Goods to them.” 
Nonetheless, the article did not prescribe a punishment for failing to abide by this rule, 
instead admonishing that “if any Merchant….shall directly or indirectly ship any Goods, 
Wares, or Merchandize….in Order to break the said Non-Importation Agreement….it 
ought to be made public,” and from then on they would have no more commercial 
relations with those individuals.116 Apparently, the stiffest sanction the Congress could 
offer to someone breaking the boycott was public shaming and a subsequent 
recommendation to blackball him, powers no different than any ordinary citizen might 
possess independent of a lawmaking body. Even then, Congress’s resolutions stated 
that they ought to make it public, not that they would do so. The Sixth article similarly 
asked that owners of ships give orders to their captains not to receive any prohibited 
British goods, recommending that those captains who received British goods be 
dismissed from service. The Eighth Article discussed how the representatives to 
Congress, in their private and public capacities, would do their best to promote frugality, 
efficiency, industry, agriculture, arts, and manufactures in America, without ordering 
anyone else to do so.  
The Ninth Article said that any merchant who engaged in what we would today 
call price gouging as a result of the increased scarcity of goods ought to no longer be 
engaged with commercially.117 The Tenth article appears more problematic, although 
only slightly so. It says that for any merchant who imports British goods after December 
1, 1774, the goods ought: 
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to be either re-shipped or delivered up to the Committee of the County, or 
Town wherein they shall be imported, to be stored at the Risque of the 
Importer, until the Non-importation Agreement shall cease, or be sold 
under the Direction of the Committee aforesaid; and in the last mentioned 
Case, the Owner or Owners of such goods shall be reimbursed.118 
On first glance, it sounds as though Congress ordered banned products to be shipped 
back, stored, or, for the last provision, to have eminent domain, essentially, applied to 
the banned British goods, whereupon the goods would be seized, sold, and the returns 
distributed to the owners. However, it used the same “ought” language as the other 
provisions, which arguably indicated that the provision was a suggestion or guideline for 
colonial action, since as an extralegal body it could not order the colonies. In the 
Eleventh article, one of the most pivotal, the Congress agreed that qualified voters in 
every part of the colonies should choose a Committee as a watchdog to observe that 
these rules were being followed; and, when someone broke the rules, the Committee 
should “cause the Truth of the Case to be published in the Gazette; to the End, that all 
such Foes to the Rights of British America may be publicly known, and universally 
contemned [sic] as the Enemies of American Liberty; and thenceforth we respectively 
will break off all Dealings with him or her.” Thus, in combination with the Twelfth article, 
it gave a specific purpose to the Committees of Correspondence that had emerged 
throughout the colonies, whose extra-legal inspections of goods would constitute the 
enforcement arm of the Continental Association. The enforcement mechanism, 
however, was officially ostracism, not coercion. The guiding hand of the Continental 
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Congress also legitimized and concretely identified the ties of association that would 
bind the resistance together with an explicit plan for boycott.119 
The Thirteenth article is an interesting one from the standpoint of the powers of 
the Congress, for it declared “That all Manufactures of this Country be sold at 
reasonable Prices, so that no undue Advantage be taken of a future Scarcity of Goods.” 
The language makes it clear that this was not a suggestion, but a specific, agreed-upon 
course of action. Here, they agreed to look down upon price gouging, or substantially 
raising prices to “unfair” or exploitative levels in the wake of events that make goods 
unusually scarce. Such profiteering, they thought, was against the spirit of unity and 
brotherhood the association was designed to promulgate. They did not offer any 
proscriptions for how price gougers should be treated or thought of, however, as they 
did in articles Ten and Eleven. Nor did they offer any guidelines for when a price was 
reasonable and when it became unreasonable.120 
 Coming to the end of the Continental Association Agreement, we see a clause 
that explained that the agreement “solemnly bind[s] ourselves and our Constituents” 
until the offending acts of Parliament are repealed. To give effect to the Association, 
they “recommend it to the provincial Conventions and to the Committees in the 
respective Colonies, to establish such farther [sic] Regulations as they may think 
proper.”121 The former language is strong, explicitly stating that the association is 
binding on the Colonial Representatives and their Constituents, while the latter suggests 
that the Association is impotent without direct action by the colonies themselves. 
Furthermore, given that a significant number of the articles involved recommendations 
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or ought statements, it is difficult to sort out exactly what it would mean for a 
recommendation to be binding. On the background of the limited grants of authority to 
the delegates, combined with the advisory nature of most of the clauses in the 
Continental Association (and Congress generally), the best interpretation of the 
Continental Association is that it was binding if, and only if, the states made it binding 
through legislative acts. Congress did not concern itself with prosecuting violators of the 
Association, leaving maintainance of the boycott up to the colonies. 
 The Continental Association was an extremely significant mode of unity and 
opposition in the lead up to war, but Congress’s lack of power to actually carry out the 
Association showed how conservative the Congress was, compared to the truly radical 
position of independence, where Congress could have been a federal legislature and a 
fount of government power. Instead, Congress could do little more than make 
recommendations and take provocative stances with regard to Parliament and its 
authority. This was an important and truly radical stance in the realm of ideas and 
persuasive influence, but not radical compared to an independent national government, 
which had not yet happened. Indeed, Patrick Henry, early on the the debates had said 
that all government was dissolved, with all of America in a state of nature, and that it 
was therefore Congress’s job to craft a Constitution, but no one agreed. Independence 
was not yet to be. 
On October 21, an address to the People of Great Britain was amended and 
approved by the Congress, which began by listing each of the colonies one-by-one, and 
proceeded at length to explain the difficulties of the current situation to their fellow 
English subjects across the sea. Congress leveled an accusation that the British have 
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“either ceased to be virtuous, or been extremely negligent in the Appointment of her 
Rules.” It also made impassioned defenses for the principles of consent of the 
governed, private property, Trial by Jury, the right to defend oneself against 
accusations, the presumption of innocence, and self-government. An address to the 
people of the several colonies was then debated, amended, and approved, which 
expressed “a dispassionate view of all Circumstances” and grievances which led the 
Congress to agree to its resolutions.122 They then resolved to prepare an address to the 
people of the British colonies of St. John’s Quebec, Nova Scotia, Georgia, and Florida. 
Nonetheless, the colonies maintained their stance that they were not aiming at 
independence, but reconciliation. 
The last, and most interesting, resolve of the day said “That the seizing, or 
attempting to seize any Person in America, in order to transport such Person beyond 
the Sea, for Trial of Offences committed within the Body of a County in America, being 
against Law, will justify, and ought to meet with Resistance and Reprisal.” Here, they 
affirmed the right of “Americans” to resist being hauled off to trial in Britain and to 
retaliate against officials who try to seize Americans and transmit them overseas for 
trial. What retaliation this purported to justify is indiscernible, but may have included the 
right to initiate proceedings against an official, or perhaps the colonial favorite tarring 
and feathering.123 
The Congress resolved to have the journals of its proceedings corrected and 
transmitted for publication on October 22, as well as to have delegates from all the 
colonies meet again in May, 1775 in Philadelphia. They also amended and approved a 
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Letter to the British Colonies that contained all the measures they approved and 
recommend the British colonies to adopt.  
On October 25, a letter to the King that had been drafted by a committee of five 
appointed by Congress October 1st was resolved to be included in a Letter to the 
Colonial Agents of the crown to be presented by these agents to the king in person. The 
Letter to the agents was approved the next day, along with a Letter To the Inhabitants of 
the Province of Quebec. Citing Cesare Beccaria and Montesquieu, they implored 
Quebec to resist the imposition on the colonies of “the extreme of Weakness and 
Misery” by Parliament and be united with the colonists in their cause. Indeed, they 
asked the Province of Quebec to join them in a “perpetual” “social Compact” by electing 
Deputies and sending them to the Congress that would be meeting in Philadelphia in 
May, 1775. This represents one of the few suggestions that Congress may have been a 
national union, united in a perpetual social compact. After this, they concluded their 
sessions and the Congress dissolved itself.124 
 The Petition of Congress to the King stated colonial grievances, such as the 
existence of a standing army in the colonies, the increasing expense and number of 
royal officials, and the burdensome restrictions on trade levied by Britain, among 
numerous others They assured the king their actions were not the result of an American 
“restless Levity of Temper,” but calm and rational opposition to the undue restriction of 
their English liberties. They also assured the king that the colonial militias would be 
sufficient to defend the colonies in the future and that the colonial legislatures are 
always happy to oblige paying sums justly requested of them for the maintenance of the 
kingdom. Finally, they asked the king to redress their grievances in order to maintain a 
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happy relationship between Great Britain and the colonies. It was much more 
conciliatory than their other edicts (as one would expect), but was located among a 
stack of other papers when transmitted to the king, and would not be considered with 
any length.125 
 To conclude, the First Continental Congress was, by and large, an association 
for the coordination of a unified opposition to British policy, rather than a lasting basis 
for perpetual union among the colonies. In short, it was not a government, which would 
have put the colonies in an extremely aggressive stance, probably even one of 
rebellion. Clearly, Congress did not act as a substitute for Parliament or the King, at 
least at this point. Furthermore, despite the strong stance the Congress took toward 
Britain, it was still at its core defensive in nature, presenting a chance for Britain to 
reconcile with the colonies, even if it wasn’t under the terms Britain would have wanted. 
It was not a body seeking war or independence. Describing the Congress, John Adams 
said: 
Their opinions are fixed against Hostilities and Ruptures….They dread the 
Thoughts of an Action because, it would make a Wound which could never be 
healed. It would fix and establish a Rancour, which would descend to the latest 
Generations. It would render all Hopes of a Reconciliation with Great Britain 
desperate. It would light up the Flames of War, perhaps through the whole 
Continent, which might rage for twenty year, and End, in the Subduction of 
America, as likely as her Liberation.126 
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Through October 1774, the Congress still thought every action taken by Congress and 
the colonies had to be carefully measured so as not to threaten war—no one desired a 
fight for independence, said many in Congress.127 Despite all the talk of the tyranny of 
Great Britain, colonial leaders at Congress were still decidedly against going to war. 
Thomas Lynch, John Dickinson, and many others left Congress with the feeling that 
only by force or further intrusions by Britain would the colonists embroil themselves in a 
civil war.128 What changed between the two Congress’s was an escalation on each side 
of rhetoric and action that made independence more likely with each passing day. 
3 THE SECOND CONGRESS, 1775-1776 
         As British rule over the New World became more unyielding by 1776 (everywhere 
except Quebec and Florida), the colonists increasingly asserted the need for 
independence and an autonomous management of their affairs. Speaking at the 
Second Virginia Convention in Richmond on March 20, 1775, Patrick Henry delivered 
an impassioned speech urging Virginia to raise militias that could come to the defense 
of Virginia if it became necessary to fight the British. Popularly known as the “Give Me 
Liberty or Give Me Death” speech, his speech was carefully reconstructed by William 
Wirt, a biographer who interviewed those present for the speech in the early nineteenth 
century. Appealing to experience as the only reasonable guide to future expectation, 
Henry hoped to dispel the lingering hopes of some at the convention who thought the 
use of force would be unnecessary and expected reconciliation with Britain by pointing 
to the tyrannical experience of the last decade for which Britain was to blame. It was 
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obvious to Henry that while the colony’s petition was met warmly in Britain, in fact the 
British were preparing for war; all one had to do was look at “those warlike preparations 
which cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies necessary to a work 
of love and reconciliation?129 
 The situation in Boston grew dire as well. By December, many in Boston were 
forced to apply for public aid and charity, who had otherwise held out until then; the 
economy of Boston was at a standstill, with commerce throughout Massachusetts 
nearly halted. 130 This, no doubt, stood in the back of the minds of every member of 
Congress as they headed to Philadelphia in May. 
Open hostilities broke out at Lexington and Concord between the Massachusetts 
militia and British soldiers in early April, 1775. General Thomas Gage, Governor of 
Massachusetts and highest British commander in the Americas, issued a patronizing 
proclamation on June 12, 1775 that was supposed to promote peace between the two 
sides by proposing amnesty “to all who in so trying a Crisis, shall manifest their 
Allegiance to the King, and Affection to the Parent State” and cease fighting. The 
proclamation was not well-received by Patriots in the colonies, however, as they 
resented being called “Incendiaries and Traitors” while the King’s government was 
described as a model of “Patience and Lenity,” among other assaults upon the honor 
and justification of the actions taken by Patriots.  As a result, British troops assaulted 
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colonial militia at Charlestown, MA at the Battle of Bunker Hill on June 17th, winning the 
battle despite costing the British over a thousand casualties.131 
 Even ten days after Lexington and Concord, John Dickinson knew it was the 
beginning of war; they were the hostilities everyone had been dreading.132 There were 
now no avenues of reconciliation for the colonists, thought Dickinson: 
But what Topicks[sic] of Reconciliation are now left for Men, Who think as I do, to 
address our Countrymen? To recommended Reverence for the Monarch or 
Affection for the Mother Country? Will the Distinctions between the Prince and 
his Ministers, between the People & their Representatives wipe out the Stains of 
Blood? 
According to Lee, because of the outbreak at Lexington and Concord, “The Province of 
N. York is at last alarmed,” turning the fiercely independent and loyalist Britain toward 
the American cause. The defeat of General Gage’s troops aroused patriotism and 
resentment against the “wanton and cruel Attack on unarmed people, after they [the 
British] had brutally killed Old Men, Women, & Children,” in Lee’s words. From then on, 
martial spirit abounded in the colonies133  That winter, clandestine military movements 
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were springing up in Connecticut, and around the colonies, in attempts to discipline the 
militia and prepare them in case they were needed to defend the colonies.134 
 Despite these problems, the resolutions of the Continental Congress were very 
popular throughout the colonies. The Pennsylvania House of Representatives approved 
all resolves and proceedings of the Congress in December. The fourth resolution 
dealing with the foundation of English liberty and the limits of Parliament to regulate the 
trade were especially popular. Massachusetts’ provisional congress approved and 
adopted it “in Strong Terms” and the people of Rhode Island approved of the 
Congressional resolves, with even slave trade merchants agreeing to abide by the 
Continental Association, despite the great harm that would come to them from it. Both 
New York and Philadelphia had high esteem for the resolves.135 Nonetheless, some 
colonies acted in ways that tended to disunify the colonies, including sending their own 
petitions to Britain, as New York did. In addition, John Penn and many Quakers were 
actively against uniting with the colonies against Britain.136 
The Second Continental Congress began taking action, creating the Continental 
Army in June of that year and issuing the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of 
Taking Up Arms on July 6, 1775, authored mainly by Thomas Jefferson and John 
Dickinson. The document was a polar reversal of the claims made by General Gage in 
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his proclamation. In the Declaration, the colonists described the “inordinate passion for 
power” of the British legislature; their possession of “an intemperate rage for unlimited 
domination”; and their contravention of the British Constitution. They said that the British 
taxed them without their consent; exercised admiralty jurisdiction unjustifiably in the 
colonies; quartered soldiers in colonists’ homes during peacetime; depriving them of 
their right to trial by jury; suspended the legislature of a colony; and prohibited the 
commerce from flowing to Boston, among other acts of “despotism.” Indeed, the 
Declaration even stated that to list these injuries was superfluous, given that the 
Parliament proclaimed in the Declaratory Act that it had the right to “bind us [the 
colonies] IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER,” which was a claim for unlimited power. 
Nonetheless, the express purpose of the 1775 Declaration was to end the war and 
reconcile with Great Britain.137 
 Two days later, on July 8th, Congress prepared the Olive Branch Petition to 
appeal directly to the King, adopting a humble tone and beseeching him to reestablish 
peace and harmony between the colonies and His Majesty’s government.138 King 
George, however, had lost patience with the colonies. On August 23, 1775, the King 
declared the colonies in a state of rebellion, “declaring that….all Our Officers, Civil and 
Military, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavors to suppress such Rebellion, and to 
bring the Traitors to Justice.”139 
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 The King and Parliament were increasingly becoming inflexible to colonial 
demands in 1775, and the colonies were becoming increasingly militant, stockpiling 
weapons and gunpowder, as well as solidifying their ideological opposition to taxation 
without representation in defense of their rights. Congress began directing the war effort 
carefully and deliberately, but in the end, the incessant hostilities made reconciliation 
with Britain seem like a distant utopia, 140 making independence the only viable course 
of action. 
On May 10, 1775, the Second Continental Congress met in Philadelphia, this 
time at the State House. It would first adjourn late in the summer of 1775, but continued 
meeting off and on through 1781, when the Articles of Confederation was fully ratified 
and the new Confederation Congress sat. The Second Congress was markedly different 
than the previous Congress, whose debates were more abstract and whose delegates 
were more hesitant to produce hostility.  
This Congress was still very concerned with the international repercussions of 
their actions, as most members of Congress wanted to avoid escalating the conflict into 
a full-scale war. Members of Congress still thought there could be reconciliation heading 
into the Fall of 1775—sometimes hopefully, sometimes reluctantly—but by the Spring of 
1776, independence became a serious discussion within and without Congress, and 
only the staunchest moderates, like John Dickinson, could trick themselves into thinking 
reconciliation was still a possibility. In May of 1775, nearly all members of Congress still 
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believed in it; even John Adams, who would turn into one of its strongest proponents in 
1776, was advocating against independence at this time.141  
This would all change over the span of a year. First, Congress entered the 
Second Congress with a greater sense of the gravity and immediacy of their positions 
as members of Congress because open hostilities had begun at Lexington and Concord 
nearly a month earlier. Second, members of Congress greatly resented what they 
believed were barbaric or underhanded tactics in the prosecution of the war effort by 
Britain that made reconciliation more and more out of reach every day. Additionally, 
Britain continued to match the staunchness of the Americans, refusing to grant their 
petitions and insisting that force was necessary to quell the colonial rebellion.  
In most cases, the most significant Congressional resolutions did not serve to 
escalate the conflict itself, but rather piggybacked on American popular sentiment—
Congress was not so much the driver of the conflict as along for the ride, albeit in a 
particularly auspicious political vantage point with the power to serve as a cement for 
continued advances and as a unified spokesperson for the American colonies. The 
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms in 1775 was passed nearly 
two months after Lexington and Concord, justifying American actions ex post facto, 
rather than ex ante. Congress passed their May 10, 1776 resolution telling the colonies 
to erect new state governments only after numerous colonies had solicited their advice 
and adopted Constitutions, including South Carolina and New Hampshire.142 The 
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Declaration of Independence was passed only after hopes of reconciliation had been 
totally extinguished, and the war had been underway for two full years. Given Congress’ 
role as a unifier, none of this should be surprising. Congress did not want to divide 
Americans with controversial or unpopular measures. They undoubtedly took radical 
stances, but not ones that the American public could not see coming. 
During this period, Congress would affirm the synthesis of natural law and 
constitutionalism on a number of occasions, culminating in the Declaration of 
Independence on July 4, 1776. While the discussion of American rights during this 
period was greatly outweighed by pressing war issues, whenever members of Congress 
discussed the issue or made resolutions in Congress dealing with the issue, they did not 
contradict their earlier espousal of both natural rights and the British constitution as the 
sources of their rights—and the events themselves played an important role in driving 
the change in Congressional sentiment by providing the crucial experience that proved 
reconciliation was not possible. 
In 1775, members of Congress began discussing issues relating to classical 
republicanism with greater frequency as the issue of good government became a more 
pressing issue, and Congress looked to their understanding of a science of government 
for answers. Though Congress was of course not yet a government, they still had a war 
effort to organize and manage, which was traditionally undertaken by governments; 
hence its applicability. In addition, in 1776 the issue of confederation was put on the 
table, making this a real political possibility—one that would come to fruition in 1781. 
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3.1 Delegate Instructions  
       The substance of delegate instructions became even more important for the 
Second Congress because their authorizations were wider than those to members of 
the first Congress and they eliminated clauses that limited delegates’ ability to vote for 
radical measures, such as independence. This was an important practical barrier that 
was removed after hostilities commenced and it escalated into a war with diminishing 
hopes for reconciliation. Utilizing the same procedure adopted by the First Continental 
Congress, Peyton Randolph was again chosen unanimously to be President of the 
Continental Congress, with Charles Thomson elected Secretary. Likewise, each 
colony’s delegates had their credentials announced at the assembly, beginning with 
New Hampshire.143 Recurring themes in the instructions to delegates to the Second 
Continental Congress included a substantial shift towards fully authorizing their 
delegates with the power to consent or agree to measures. Even though this authority 
was limited by its purposes—redress of American grievances, protecting American 
liberties, or reconciling with Britain—it now represented a majority of colonial 
instructions: South Carolina, Maryland, Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, New 
Hampshire, and North Carolina. As war escalated, many of the states which had issued 
significant restrictions in 1774, such as Pennsylvania’s which only permitted them to 
seek reconciliatory measures, were revoked in favor of instructions that permitted 
delegates to vote for independence. 
The New Hampshire convention voted to delegate representation at the 
Congress to John Sullivan and John Langdon, vesting them with “full and ample power, 
in Behalf of this Province, to consent and agree to all Measures, which said Congress 
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shall deem necessary, to obtain Redress of American Grievances.”144 This power was 
very similar to the broad powers vested to the delegates at the First Congress, albeit in 
terser language. The first delegation was given permission to “devise, consult, and 
adopt” measures while the second delegation had permission to “consent and agree to 
all Measures,” having an equivalent effect. 
In Massachusetts Bay, the Provincial Congress had agreed to support the 
“American Bill of Rights,” i.e., the Declaration of Rights and Grievances agreed to by the 
First Congress, on December 10, 1774, and immediately appointed a number of 
delegates to attend the Second Continental Congress. They advised their delegates 
that they had “full Power….to concert, agree upon direct and order such Measures, as 
shall to them appear to be best calculated for the Recovery and Establishment of 
American Rights and Liberties, and for restoring Harmony between Great-Britain and 
the Colonies.”145 These instructions were a good deal stronger than the first instructions, 
explicitly stating that they had full Power, presumably equivalent to the colonial 
legislature, and could direct and order measures. Despite the Revolutionary turmoil 
enacted in the colonies, especially within Massachusetts, we still could see that the 
delegates were charged with restoring relations with Britain, rather than separating.146 
South Carolina’s delegates had similarly strong instructions as well.147 
New York’s delegates were chosen at a convention of the various New York 
counties “with full Power….to concert and determine upon such measures as shall be 
judged most effectual for the Preservation and Re-establishment of American Rights 
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and Privileges, and for the Restoration of Harmony between Great-Britain and the 
Colonies.”148 Unlike the previous instructions, where the delegates’ only instructions 
were “to represent them [the various counties in New York] in Congress” the delegates 
to the Second Continental Congress were given specific purposes and full power to 
determine upon measures.149  
In Pennsylvania, representatives were appointed “to concert and agree upon 
such farther [sic] Measures, as shall appear to them best calculated for the 
Accommodation of the unhappy Differences between Great Britain and the Colonies, on 
a constitutional Foundation.”150 Pennsylvania’s instructions were noteworthy because 
they explicitly advised the representatives to find a constitutional foundation for redress, 
intended to express an opposition to anything extra-constitutional, such as launching a 
civil war. It also might be treated as a partial rebuke of the combination of the 
constitutional and natural law traditions in the previous Congress’ resolutions. In this 
regard, Delaware’s instructions had a nearly identical mandate. Delaware only indicated 
their purpose was to be repairing relations with Britain and protecting American rights 
according to the English constitution, standing in contrast to the radical basis of natural 
rights that some delegates argued for in the First Congress.151 These kind of 
instructions would limit the authority of members of Congress to vote for independence, 
and other closely-related measures, and were thus revoked at various points from 1775 
to 1776, crucial for permitting members to vote for independence. 
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In Maryland, “At a Meeting of the Deputies appointed by the several Counties of 
the Province of Marlyand,” appointed deputies with “full and ample Power to consent 
and agree to all Measures, which such Congress shall deem necessary and effectual, to 
obtain a Redress of American Grievances; and this Province bind themselves to 
execute to the utmost of their Power, all Resolutions which the said Congress may 
adopt.”152 Maryland’s instructions represented the clearest and strongest delegation of 
authority to the acts of the Second Continental Congress, giving its delegates both full 
authority to agree to any measures that would help redress their grievances and 
declaring these acts binding on itself. It also represented the strongest increase in 
authority to its delegates and thus to the Continental Congress. The instructions of the 
previous year only gave its deputies authority to “effect one general Plan of Conduct” 
that would relieve Boston and preserve the colonists’ liberties, which was at best an 
ambiguous grant of authority, as it is difficult to uncover how broadly the word “effect” 
could be construed.153 North Carolina’s instructions were similar to Maryland’s, 
proclaiming that Congressional acts would be obligatory on every inhabitant of North 
Carolina.  
Lyman Hall arrived to the convention on May 13, 1775 as a delegate of the 
parish of St. John’s, Georgia with instructions to “represent and act for this parish” in the 
Congress without much instruction, although the credentials mentioned concerns about 
maintaining the Continental Association and procuring trade with the other colonies so 
that it could effectively boycott the trade of merchants who refused to join the 
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association, especially in Savannah.154 Hall’s instructions expressed the Parish’s 
adherence to the resolutions of the last Continental Congress, as well as the differences 
that occasioned the parish to come representing itself rather than be aligned with the 
whole colony of Georgia, which had not been as diligent in adhering to the resolutions of 
the Continental Association, causing them to “detach” from the rest of the colony.155  
Later instructions would appear during the year, most of which involved simple 
repetitions of the instructions from the beginning of the Second Congress (this was true 
of instructions from Maryland, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, and 
Massachusetts), with seeming increase in authority for New Jersey and a weaker one 
for New Hampshire.156157 Delegates from Georgia appeared for the first time after 
Congress adjourned for a month from August 1st to September 12th, stating their 
purpose of defending the rights and liberties of America and restoring harmony with 
Great Britain. It authorized delegates with “full and whole power” to “do, transact, join, 
and concur” in Congressional resolutions, as well as promised that the colony would 
“abide by, enforce, and carry into execution [Congress’s designs], or endeavor at the 
risque and expence [sic] of Life and Property to do so.”158 This was an increased 
authority from the delegates from St. John’s parish. Virginia’s delegates, appointed in 
convention, were given authority to represent the colony in “General Congress,” without 
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further instruction.159 Maryland’s delegates were authorized with “full and ample power 
to consent and agree to all measures” of the Congress in order to “obtain a redress of 
American grievances,” the same authority as their prior instructions.160 New Hampshire 
likewise gave its delegates the same authority.161  
What can be concluded by looking at the delegations of authority for the Second 
Continental Congress? First, and most importantly, there was an increasing gravity of 
the hostilities with Britain, which came with a parallel strengthening of the authority 
delegated to colonial representatives by their convention, assemblies, and other political 
bodies. Like the first Congress, the authorizations specified the limited purposes for 
which the delegates were authorized to act. North Carolina and Maryland, alone among 
the colonies, stated that the actions of Congress would be binding on their colonies. The 
gradual abolition of the explicit restrictions present in instructions—namely the ones that 
permitted members to consent only to measures that were reconciliatory—were 
probably the most important feature in the instructions that had long-term significance. 
Without this abolition, the debate on independence could have been delayed, or strung 
out over a longer period of time, which could have stunted the impact a Declaration 
would have had on the unity of the colonies. 
3.2 Resolutions: Dashing Hopes of Reconciliation 
By and large, the Second Congress acted primarily in an advisory capacity in its 
relationship to the colonies (and then states), rather than a superintendent capacity. Not 
until after independence was declared would Congress acquire any exclusive powers 
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that would distinguish it from the advisory body it acted as throughout the early 
Revolution.  
Congressional resolutions took two broad forms. First, there were many 
instances where Congress explicitly recommended, advised, or requested the colonies 
to act. Second, there were many instances where Congress directly acted and ordered 
actions to be taken by the Continental army and the treasury. As for the first, while the 
advisory resolutions were numerous and gave the appearance of ordering the colonies 
around in minute detail, the language of the resolutions—recommending, advising, or 
requesting—recognized the reality that colonies were not obligated to obey. They did 
not pretend to have the authority to order colonial committees, assemblies, or 
governors, nor did they have the power in any case. 
Second, a substantial number of resolutions featured Congress acting in a direct 
capacity, primarily to order the treasury to authorize the payment of debts they owed to 
soldiers or contractors, and to direct the Continental army.162 This showcased their 
direct, authoritative capacity over members of the army or the administration. While 
these general rules were occasionally violated (increasingly over time), even when 
Congress made resolutions that seemed to place Congress in a supreme role over the 
colonies, or direct the colonies in detail, they would step back and disavow that they 
were crossing this line or explicitly word their resolutions as recommendations. 
Nevertheless, it was true that Congress was imploring the colonies to take a vigorous 
and active role in prosecuting the war effort, including suggesting that the colonies 
sacrifice liberties for wartime security.163 While construing these recommendations 
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broadly by perceiving them as orders would be a mistake, when superimposed on the 
background of the limited colonial instructions, Congress clearly was still organized for 
limited, temporary purposes and did not have either the authority or the power to bind 
the colonies. To the extent that Congressional resolutions were binding, the colonies 
bound themselves—and their resolutions were generally concentrated in the area of war 
and foreign relations, rather than internal governance. 
Third, the colonies specifically asked for the guidance of Congress on a number 
of issues, including ones of supreme importance, like the erection of new state 
governments capably equipped to prosecute the war effort effectually during this period 
of hostilities with Britain.164 That Congress concerned themselves with colonial 
governance, then, should not be surprising, nor should it be indicative of governmental 
authority—especially since, in each case, they worded it as a recommendation. As the 
war progressed, and the prospect for reconciliation vanished, Congress actually felt 
obligated to recommend to all the colonies that they erect new governments that would 
not be influenced by Britain and were fit to the circumstances of the individual colonies, 
rather than to the needs of the British empire.165 This was an extremely radical 
recommendation; moderates in Congress likened this recommendation to a declaration 
of independence from Britain, since the erection of independent governments seemed 
to indicate a clear intention to separate, rather than reconcile. However, as radical as 
the measure was, the war had substantially deepened in the two years since the First 
Congress met. Congress had launched an invasion of Canada that, by the accounts 
given by members of Congress in their correspondence, had all but failed by May 1776, 
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when they issued the resolution. In addition, the grievances against Britain had 
continued to grow, as Britain’s harsh conduct in the war angered many colonists and 
made them more staunchly patriotic, or even converted them from loyalists to patriots. 
Therefore, although one of the enduring themes of congressional resolutions through 
the first half of 1776 was that they repeatedly denied that the colonies were aiming at 
independence, once they recommended to the colonies that they form their own state 
governments in May of 1776, the tide had turned toward independence, and many in 
Congress became less fearful of discussing independence.  
Through the first third of 1776, members of Congress made sure not to act in 
ways that would suggest the King did not possess sovereignty. They recognized he had 
some superintending authority, but Congress denied it was an unlimited sovereign 
authority. They continually affirmed that they were still his subjects, even though the 
colonists were simultaneously asserting that ultimate sovereignty resided in the people. 
Congress was also cagey about its own authority. To have created a national 
government without the permission of the Crown or Parliament might have been 
interpreted as a de facto declaration of independence. By its actions, Congress was not 
trying to give this impression. Delegates must have recognized that what they were 
doing was extralegal and extra constitutional, and their actions reflect caution against 
stepping out too far. Members of Congress, like Edmund Pendleton, continually 
dispelled notions that the dispute was about America’s independence, rather than 
Parliament’s claim to regulate the trade of the colonies without their consent, talking 
about restoring “a Constitutional Connection” with Britain, which included consenting to 
regulation of trade enacted for the common good, as well as the Navigation Acts up to 
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1763. Pendleton thought that as long as Britain monopolized America’s trade, this was 
enough compensation to Britain to contribute toward the expense of defending the 
empire.166 Many in Britain had created a campaign of misinformation about the 
colonists’ grand designs for independence, which the colonists had to continually rebut 
so they didn’t look bad. This situation in Britain was very concerning to Congress, 
especially when they received reports from Americans living in Britain, such as Patience 
Wright, that suggested there were many in Britain who believed that Americans had 
forfeited their charter because of their unity in relieving Boston, and instead deserved a 
charter like the Quebec Act of 1774. The Quebec Act was seen by many Americans as 
a sign of things to come; a new form of colonial administration which would eviscerate 
the colonial assemblies and end independent, internal colonial governance, so this 
rumor was an unpleasant thought.167 
The most visible effect the war was having on American thought, viewed through 
a Congressional lens, was that, on a day to day basis, their lofty ideals gave way to 
concerns about self-preservation. To be sure, ideals would still play important roles 
throughout the Congress (and arguably provided the strongest legacy of the Continental 
Congresses), but this was a very small wave in a sea of practical discussion until May 
1776, when Congress began discussing the erection of new state governments, 
independence, confederation, and diplomatic relations with the world. With the 
Declaration of Independence, Congress made a statement that, among other things, the 
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American synthesis of natural law and British constitutionalism was there to stay, and 
was the unique feature of American thought. 
*** 
One of the first orders of business of the Second Continental Congress was 
reading aloud a circular from American diplomats to Britain that detailed the results of 
the First Continental Congress’s efforts to secure redress of American grievances.168 
Their efforts were a failure, as Parliament confirmed its intent to enforce existing laws 
on the colonists, refused to withdraw troops from Boston, and ordered a sizable number 
of troops to set off for America.169 Next they read a letter from the Provincial Congress 
of Massachusetts Bay, a number of pertinent resolutions enacted by the Congress, and 
other documents of importance to the Congress. In the letter from the Massachusetts 
Congress, they argued that because of the bloodlust of the British army, they 
themselves must raise an army, and had already passed a resolve for 13,600 men. This 
act was done without the direction of Congress, and they noted that other colonies (New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) were considering similar propositions to 
raise an army. The letter then called for the Continental Congress to raise an army, as 
well as to lend legitimacy to the securities just issued by the colony of Massachusetts, 
with which they hoped to borrow one hundred thousand pounds in coined gold and 
silver at six per cent interest.170 This set the stage for Congress to create the 
Continental Army and establish a treasury to pay for Continental expenses. 
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Undoubtedly, these events played monumental importance in setting the tone for the 
Second Congress, as the failure of Britain to take any step toward reconciliation with the 
colonies made their efforts at moderation a total failure. Congress had put the burden of 
taking a first step on Britain, and both Parliament and the King did nothing of the sort. 
Congress was now more comfortable taking a strong defensive posture toward Britain 
at a trans-colonial level, which in the last Congress was almost unthinkable, though the 
issue had been brought into discussion from time to time by radicals like Richard Henry 
Lee. With both Britain’s refusal to act, and many states taking the defensive initiatives 
themselves, Congress was compelled to follow suit.  
These actions did not yet entirely extinguish Congressmen’s desire and belief of 
reconciliation, however. It would take another year for Congress to be ground down by 
Britain’s stonewalling and prosecution of the war before they could seriously consider 
independence. For many the hopes were dim, but they still thought it possible that a 
change in the Ministry, toward members more disposed to reconciliation, would bring 
about peace soon, as Joseph Hewes did. In a letter to a London Mercantile Firm, 
Hewes expressed this sentiment, in addition to repeating that the colonists were loyal to 
the king, earnestly disavowing any motives for independence, let alone revolution. As 
“loyal subjects” to the king, they would still “sacrifice [their] lives, and willingly launch out 
every shilling of [their] property” in defense of “crown and dignity.”171 Richard Henry Lee 
also expected Parliamentary resolve to unravel in Britain, with the recent failure of the 
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ministerial schemes to undermine the colonies, the failure of Canada to help the fight 
against America, and the unhappiness of the people in Britain with the situation.172 
Congress was also extremely concerned with making it known to the world that 
they made every last effort to reconcile, short of giving up their liberties, before they 
were willing to vie for independence.  But this meant that establishing American liberties 
was their first priority while reconciling with Britain was their second, conditional on the 
first for most in Congress. Samuel Ward said it was important that America not go for 
peace except on terms that protected American rights, because “many nations have 
rose from a State of the most severe civil Wars to the highest Pitch of Glory and 
Happiness but Slavery never produced one single Good since the Creation.”173 
Likewise, John Adams wrote that: 
Our Consolation must be this, my dear, that Cities may be rebuilt, and a 
People reduced to Poverty, may acquire fresh Property. But a Constitution 
of Government once changed from Freedom, can never be restored. 
Liberty once lost is lost forever. When the People once surrender their 
share in the Legislature, and their Right of defending the Limitations upon 
the Government, and of resisting every encroachment upon them, they 
can never regain it.174 
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They did not want to be seen by the world as rebels or traitors, but freedom-fighters. 
Members of Congress even held out hopes that the war would end quickly; in May, 
1775, Benjamin Franklin wanted to continue with the trade boycott, thinking this would 
be the source of America’s victory, even though fighting had recently broken out.175 
John Adams thought that due to the strength of America’s newly-appointed top military 
officers, by force of arms America would be able to secure a redress of grievances in 
the near future.176 
 While congressional language and actions plainly showed that members took 
pains to indicate that they were not aiming at independence, the situation would 
radically shift in May 1776. On May 16, 1775, Congress resolved to consider “the State 
of America,” creating a report that was read on May 26th, after which the Congress 
resolved to be in “a state of Defence” because of the commencement of hostilities 
against Massachusetts. However, they also expressed their intention to restore 
harmony with Great Britain at the same time; they did see fit to declare war and 
independence. Additionally, the Congress resolved that the militia of New York city be 
armed, trained, and kept in a state of readiness in case the British should invade.177 
 Early in 1775, Congress was frantic that the measures taken by the colonists 
stayed defensive in nature, and did not turn into acts of conquest. On May 17th, 
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Congress resolved to cease trade with Quebec, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Georgia 
(excepting St. John’s), and Florida. The next day, they read a letter concerning the 
taking of Fort Ticonderoga, after which they made a resolution advising the Committees 
of New York and Albany to move the cannon and other stores that were stored there by 
the British to Lake George, siding with the detachment of men from Massachusetts and 
Connecticut who, Congress said, found out that Britain had planned to invade the 
colonies from Quebec and took the fort out of regard for their safety. Significantly, they 
advised the colonists to take an inventory of the confiscated goods because Congress 
expected that they would be returned once they made peace with Britain and again 
subjected themselves to British rule.178 While they made no plans for paying for the tea 
the Bostonians dumped into Boston Harbor, they did provide for returning other 
confiscated goods should Britain change its tune. On May 29, a Letter to the Inhabitants 
of Canada was approved, which admonished Canadians to refuse to take Britain’s side 
in the war against America, for Canadians were also experiencing similar injustices 
against them inflicted by Britain. They also admonished that Canada should not hold the 
taking of Ticonderoga and Crown Point as acts of aggression against Canada, but as 
acts “dictated by the great Law of Self-preservation.” This made for a very delicate 
situation. On June 1, Congress resolved “That no Expedition or Incursion ought to be 
undertaken or made, by any Colony or Body of Colonists, against or into Canada.” 
Congress considered multiple times an “Expedition to Montreal,” i.e,, an invasion of 
Canada, in an attempt to forestall British attempts on Ticonderoga and Crown Point, but 
the resolution was defeated for unknown reasons on June 1, though one could assume 
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it was because the only goal of the colonies at that point was defense not conquest.179 
The policy regarding Canada would be reversed in short order within the frame of a 
month, when Congress advised General Schuyler to use his judgment whether or not to 
invade Canada, thus keeping a public appearance, for the time being, of not being 
aggressive, while secretly favoring it. Silas Deane, and many other members of 
Congress, thought capturing Canada was crucially important in order to “destroy the 
present administration,” which they thought the surest way to bring redress.180 Members 
of Congress continually reaffirmed its importance, which only made it more devastating 
when they thought the invasion had failed in May, 1776, eliminating one of their last 
hopes for redress, and making independence practically sound.181 
On July 6, 1775, Congress agreed to a Declaration of Causes and Necessity of 
their taking up Arms, authored mainly by Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, one of 
the most important resolutions to come out of Congress that year. In it, Congress 
rejected an absolute authority of Parliament over any group of people, let alone the 
American colonies as British subjects, even calling this “enslaving….by violence.” 
Nevertheless, Congress continued to admonish that taking up arms was only a 
defensive measure, and one that they would cease once their burdens were relieved. 
They still proclaimed that they had no intention to dissolve their Union with Great 
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Britain.182 The document was a polar reversal of the claims made by General Gage in 
his own proclamation. In the Declaration, the colonists described the “inordinate passion 
for power” of the British legislature, their possession of “an intemperate rage for 
unlimited domination,” and their contravention of the British Constitution. They said that 
the British were taxing them without their consent; exercising admiralty jurisdiction 
unjustifiably in the colonies; quartering soldiers in colonists’ homes during peacetime; 
depriving them of their right to trial by jury; suspended the legislature of a colony; and 
prohibited the commerce from flowing to Boston, among other acts of “despotism.” 
Indeed, the Declaration even mentions that to list these injuries is superfluous, given 
that the Parliament proclaimed in the Declaratory Act that it had the right to “bind us [the 
colonies] IN ALL CASES WHATSOEVER,” which was a claim for unlimited power. 
Nonetheless, the express purpose of the Declaration was to end the war and reconcile 
with Great Britain.183 John Adams thought the Declaration so forceful that “If Lord North 
dont [sic] compliment every Mothers Son of us, with a Bill of Attainder, in Exchange for 
it, I shall think it owing to Fear,” for the Declaration was more radical than anything 
Henry or Hancock had done to that point.184  
By August Jefferson thought that because of the outbreak of war at Lexington 
and Concord, the First Congress’s reasonable terms of reconciliation, where they gave 
up the right to regulate trade and all acts of Parliament before 1763, would not be 
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accepted today; thus, bloodshed had changed the tune of Congress and made them 
more resolute in their beliefs and the American cause.185 
They subsequently wrote and sent a petition to the king on July 8th. In this Olive 
Branch Petition, they expressed the same view much more humbly, without questioning 
the sovereign authority of His Majesty, just as they did in the last Congress. They 
appealed directly to the King, begging him to intervene, and beseeching him to 
reestablish peace and harmony between the colonies and His Majesty’s government186 
Congress knew that the King had the ability to invoke his prerogative, which had the 
advantage of superseding Parliamentary authority. Additionally, Congress recognized 
that most colonial charters, excepting Georgia, came from kingly authority, not 
Parliament, meaning Parliament had no authority to regulate them. Though it was 
stricken from the final petition, John Jay’s draft located “God and the Constitution” as 
the source of their liberties and rights, affirming both natural law and constitutionalism. 
Twice in the petition Jay indicated that the colonies were not aiming at independence, 
suggesting that to restore mutual harmony, it was absolutely necessary to stop the 
fighting and suspend the Parliamentary and ministerial measures that precipitated the 
conflict.187 As Dickinson wrote, the petition to the king “make[s] no Claim, and 
mention[s] no Right,” in order for the colonies to prostrate themselves fully before the 
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king in the hopes this would help end the bloodshed.188 Following this, they sent a letter 
to the inhabitants of Great Britain, attempting to arouse their indignation more than the 
last address did, which asserted the colonists’ rights and the wrongs they sustained. 
The letter attempted to discount the rumors that America was aiming at independence, 
add to the list of injuries they had received, and identify the cause of America with the 
spirit and history of British liberty.189 Richard Henry Lee, in his draft address, talked 
about how the purported right of Parliament to tax America to raise revenue was 
“contrary to the clearest principles of justice and the English constitution….[without] 
consent,” speaking of “the glorious constitution of England, that work of Ages.”190 
King George, however, had lost patience with the colonies. On August 23, 1775, 
the king declared the colonies in a state of rebellion, “declaring that….all Our Officers, 
Civil and Military, are obliged to exert their utmost endeavors to suppress such 
Rebellion, and to bring the Traitors to Justice.”191 By Spring of 1776, many members of 
Congress had lost hope of reconciliation with Britain, feeling that it was now either 
victory or total subjection. Congress continued to maintain publicly its desire for 
reconciliation, but the repeated failures of petitions, and the continued accumulation of 
novel grievances, dashed many hopes. The King had answered negatively to 
Congress’s petitions, reaffirming his support in Parliament and their measures, arguing 
that force would continue to be necessary as long as the colonists continued to rebel 
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rather than submit.192 The House of Lords’ denial of the Earl of Chatham’s plan for 
reconciliation, developed in collaboration with Benjamin Franklin and introduced and 
defeated in the House on February 1, 1775, also influenced Congress’s understanding 
of the resolve of Parliament against giving ground to the Americans; plus, motions by 
Edmund Burke and David Hartley on moving toward reconciliation with colonies were 
defeated.193 
A number of incidents made Congress feel the need to prove British injustice and 
thereby justify their actions to the world. One grievance Britain gave to the colonies was 
the prohibition of fishing the the North Atlantic for the New England colonies through the 
New England Restraining Act of March 30, 1775.194 Another grievance was “The Perfidy 
of General Gage in breaking his Capitulation with Boston and detaining their Effects,” as 
Benjamin Franklin phrased it in a letter to Jonathan Shipley. Gage had promised 
Bostonians the right to leave with their effects and then confiscated their effects as they 
tried to leave. A third involved the burning of 400 houses in Charlestown by British 
troops, at the time of the Battle of Bunker Hill, angered many members of Congress, 
including Benjamin Franklin, who said “In all our Wars, from our first settlement in 
America, to the present time, we never received so much damage from the Indian 
Savages as in this one day from these.” His point was that continued barbarity by the 
                                               
192 Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, Philadelphia June 8, 1775, in Paul H. Smith, ed. 
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-1979), 
1:459; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, Philadelphia, September 15, 1775, in Smith, Letters 
of Delegates to Congress, 2:14-15; Samuel Ward to George Washington, Philadelphia, 
September 17, 1775, in Smith, Letters of Delegates to Congress, 2:26-27. 
193 Benjamin Franklin, Proposed Resolutions, May ? 1775, in Paul H. Smith, ed. Letters 
of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-1979), 1:1: 425-
426; similar motions by Edmund Burke and David Hartley on moving toward reconciliation with 
the colonies were defeated. 
194 North Carolina Delegates to the North Carolina Committees, Philadelphia, June 19, 
1775, in Paul H. Smith, ed. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library 
of Congress, 1976-1979), 1:511-515.  
 
 
 
96 
British would induce the Americans to fight more vigorously, rather than convince them 
to reconcile, including the barbarity of enlisting the Natives to fight the colonists.195 By 
July 7, 1775, then, Franklin had given up hope of reconciliation, saying that this petition 
to the king would likely be Congress’ last.196 
Congress also acted with a direct, authoritative capacity when it would authorize 
the payment of debts, emit Continental Currency, and direct the Continental army, 
members of its administration in positions that it had created. Congress’s vigorous role 
in directing the army and administrative governance must not be confused with 
government, and its resolutions confused with binding edicts, since it wasn’t exercising 
authority unique to a national, governmental body. To the extent that Congressional 
resolutions were binding, the colonies bound themselves. These concerns gradually 
took over the concerns of Congress, with each decision becoming less deliberate, and 
the volume of resolutions growing in number. 
The Second Congress began its systematic efforts to raise an army in defense of 
the colonies early, which they hoped could defend the thirteen colonies from the British, 
while trying to reconcile with Britain, even if this hope grew fainter with each passing 
day. This would include a comprehensive military code, specific instructions to generals, 
payment of soldiers and contractors, ensuring the supply of provisions like beef and 
pork,197 outfitting ships,198 and more. On June 14, 1775, less than two months after 
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Lexington and Concord, Congress agreed to a number of resolutions concerning 
military organization, pay, and instructions. These included the raising of companies of 
riflemen, the organization of the companies, year-long enlistments, and instructions that 
each soldier had to have their own weapon and uniform. The next day, Congress 
resolved to appoint a General of the Continental Army, who would be paid 500 dollars 
per month, choosing George Washington for the generalship, which he accepted. They 
likewise resolved to appoint a number of other positions in the Continental Army, 
including Brigadiers General, Quartermaster General, and Chief Engineer, and then set 
their pay.199 In drafting their Commission to General Washington, they addressed the 
head of the letter, “In Congress. The Delegates of the United Colonies of New 
Hampshire, Massachusets-Bay [sic], Rhode Island,” and so on, individually. In the 
commission, they did specify that under the commission, Washington was “vested with 
full Power and Authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the 
Service,” but he was also thereby “enjoin[ed] and require[d]” by Congress “to be careful 
in executing the great Trust reposed in [him], by causing strict Discipline and Order to 
be observed in the Army, and that the Soldiers be duly exercised, and provided with all 
convenient Necessaries.”200  
On June 30, 1775, they prescribed the rules and regulations of the Continental 
Army.201 Late in November, Congress agreed to a number of rules and regulations of 
the Continental Navy, which included punishing those who “curse or blaspheme the 
name of God,” by making them “wear a wooden collar, or some other shameful badge 
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of distinction for so long time as he shall judge proper.”202 Earlier in the month, 
Congress provided that all soldiers leaving the army had to leave behind their working 
firearms, for which they would compensate them. They also recommended that the New 
England legislatures begin impressing carriages, horses, and other means of 
transportation to aid in the march of the army.203 On June 22, the Congress resolved to 
furnish all troops with “Camp Equipage” and blankets and pay for them out of the 
“Continental Expence,” at which point they resolved to emit Bills of Credit for up to two 
million dollars to pay for war expenses. They also resolved “That the Twelve 
Confederated Colonies be pledged for the redemption of the Bills of Credit,” which 
would be titled Continental Currency.204 The issue of the devaluation of the currency 
became a major issue throughout the war, as many people saw a risk in accepting 
continental currency that they didn’t see with accepting milled gold or silver coinage. In 
May of 1776, the Commissioners of Canada norted in a letter to John Hancock that 
Canadians had ceased accepting the Continental altogether.205 
Congress would act directly when it appointed ambassadors to act on behalf of 
the colonies assembled in Congress when engaging with other nations. This role would 
increase after declaring independence in 1776, but it was also necessary for Congress 
to manage their relations with the indian tribes even earlier. Congress did not want to 
enlist the Natives themselves, which would be a sign to Britain that they weren’t 
                                               
202 Ibid., 1:262-263. 
203 Ibid., 1:233-5, 279. 
204 Ibid., 1:125-6. 
205 Commissioners of Canada to John Hancock, Montreal, May 17, 1776, in Paul H. 
Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789. Vol. IV: May 17 1776-August 15 1776 
(Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-1979), 22-23. 
 
 
 
99 
desirous of reconciliation, as James Duane noted.206 On July 12, 1775, they appointed 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs that would act on behalf of the colonies united in 
Congress, giving them “Power to take to their Assistance Gentlemen of Influence 
among the Indians in whom they can confide, and to appoint Agents, residing near or 
among the Indians, to watch the Conduct of the Superintendants and their 
Emissaries.”207 This was Congress’ ambassadorial role, a role to coordinate unified 
actions among the thirteen colonies. On January 28th, 1776, Congress regulated trade 
with the Indians.208 Britain would repeatedly provoke or enlist the Natives to attack the 
colonists, bring about the ire of Congress; as Benjamin Franklin said, the biggest 
grievance through September, 1775 was the biggest grievance, according to Franklin, 
was “The Exciting the Savages to fall upon our innocent Outsettlers.”209 
Both the incitement of Natives, and the recruitment by Britain of mercenary 
fighters of various nationalities provoked much hostility and resentment among colonists 
and Congressmen alike, who were angry Britain would pay mercenaries to fight them 
instead of British troops. They could at least hope that British troops had reservations 
about dealing savagely with Americans, whereas mercenaries they thought would care 
less. 210 
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Just as Congress found the gunpowder stores and other supplies of war 
inadequate to its purposes and acted to correct this deficiency, it also acted in other 
areas to serve its needs. On July 26th, 1775, Congress resolved to appoint a 
Postmaster General, who would help ensure the communications of and among the 
colonies, including a specifically enumerated recommendation to the Postmaster 
General—elected as Benjamin Franklin—“to establish a weekly Post to South Carolina.” 
The next day, Congress established a hospital for the army.211 These and other 
necessary incidents of war Congress made efforts to provide, but as long as Congress 
was hoping to reconcile, its abilities to do this would remain limited. Congress did not 
want to overspend in these areas and then run out of resources to actually fight the war, 
nor did it want to overspend and then find the war ended, with all the resources going to 
waste. It needed the certainty of a prolonged war, via the pursuit of independence, 
before it could draw upon an enlarged source of funding. 
Soon after, Congress established Treasurers of the United Colonies, choosing 
Michael Hillegas and George Clymer as the treasurers. Each colony would choose a 
treasurer for their own colony to handle requisitions, or their quotal share of the 
expenses of the Congress. The quotal share was determined in Congress, with 
subsequent shares to be determined by Congress according to population.212 Congress 
made no provision to tax the colonies itself, as each colony was expected to lay and 
levy taxes itself. On August 1st, 1775, they began doling out sums to the Paymaster 
General from the Continental treasury to pay for the expenses of the Continental 
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Army.213 The power to tax, or to demand money from citizens and enforce the demand, 
was clearly not within the powers of Congress—a power absolutely central to sovereign 
governments. Without the power to tax, Congress had to rely on voluntary contributions 
from the colonies and a willingness to accept Continental Currency as legal tender. 
After being informed that some citizens of Philadelphia refused to accept Continental 
Currency in exchange for goods or services,214 Congress resolved that anyone who 
shall be convicted of refusing to accept Continental Currency by a Committee of a 
colony should be deemed an enemy of America and boycotted from trade.215 Some 
members of Congress thought not only should they be deemed enemies of America, but 
that they should be treated like one legally. Taking stock of an issue that had been 
plaguing the American cause as of late, John Adams wrote that the depreciation of the 
Continental Currency was affecting the ability of the army to procure goods at a stable 
price. “[Y]ou must not Say, that a milled Dollar is better than a Paper Dollar. It is an 
offence against the Public, which ought to be punished, and the criminality of it must be 
ascertained, and punished, to give or take a farthing more for Silver than Paper.” 
Nevertheless, Adams thought they needed to stop emitting more paper money, and 
instead borrow money for notes on interest, which would attend its own difficulties, 
including the likelihood of high interest rates.216 
 As the war progressed, Congress became very concerned with the possibility of 
spies and other “traitors” doing damage to their cause. On October 14th, 1775, 
Congress appointed a new director general and chief physician of the hospital in 
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Massachusetts, replacing Dr. Benjamin Church, who had been appointed by the 
Congress in July. Church had been “taken into custody for holding a correspondence 
with the enemy,”217 and was ultimately convicted of communicating with the enemy by 
the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, rather than by agents of the Continental 
Congress.218 Congress resolved, on November 7: 
That Dr. Church be close confined in some secure goal [jail] in the colony 
of Connecticut, without use of pen, ink, and paper, and that no person be 
allowed to converse with him, except in the presence and hearing of a 
magistrate of the town, or the sheriff of the county where he is confined, 
and in the English language, until farther [sic] orders from this or a future 
Congress.219 
During the Revolution, Congress did not have a national judicial power to 
prosecute criminals for ordinary crimes as they do today. Congress did provide 
for military tribunals and courts-martial to try individuals for war-related crimes,220 
but these courts were necessary and proper incidents of fighting the war. Once 
they had raised an army to defend the colonies, such tribunals and courts-martial 
would naturally follow on its heels. Just as with hospitals and a postal service, 
setting up a special court system would be substantial work and effort, hence 
they tended to rely on the colonial courts to punish offenders, or summary 
judgments of military personnel, in order to achieve their ends without having to 
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set up a national bureaucracy, which would again give the appearance of aiming 
at independence, which was still undesirable. 
Late in 1775, as Congress began ramping up the navy, Congress started setting 
up rules surrounding privateering. In November, Congress resolved that all ships 
engaged in making war against the colonies or transporting goods for the British would 
be seized and considered forfeited. They also stipulated that any ship acting as a prize 
vessel could only do so after authorization from Congress or one of the Colonies. They 
also recommended that the colonial legislatures establish prize courts to deal with 
captures, and in all cases those who are prosecuted in these prize courts have appeal 
to Congress.221 These resolutions, as we’ll see later, became the subject of some 
controversy, including a Supreme Court case that was decided in 1795, Penhallow et al. 
v. Doane’s Administrators. Given that they had created an army and navy, it was 
reasonable that they established a process for dealing with prizes and captures,222 but it 
is perhaps presumptuous that they gave them a role as an appellate court in state prize 
and capture cases. The Congress issued letters of marque and reprisal, signed by the 
president of the Congress, which would be doled out by the councils and assemblies of 
the colonies.223 
Early on, with military engagement less frequent, colonies frequently petitioned 
Congress for direction on how to preserve the safety of their colony, while preventing 
all-out war with Britain. After considering an application from New York as to what they 
should do if British troops should arrive, Congress recommended that New York act 
defensively in order to preserve their safety and security, including “defend[ing] 
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themselves and their Property…[to] repel Force by Force” if the troops commenced 
hostilities.224 Having heard from Colonel Arnold that four hundred men were preparing 
to retake Crown Point and Ticonderoga, Congress requested that the governor of 
Connecticut, Jonathan Trumbull, send reinforcements to defend the Forts until further 
directions should be made from Congress. They also ordered the President of the 
Congress, in his letter to Trumbull, to express that it was the desire of Congress to have 
the Governor appoint someone commander of the men at the Forts.225 We can already 
see early in 1775 the pattern of recommending, rather than ordering direction of the war 
effort to governors, colonial assemblies, and committees. 
Given how quickly hostilities had arisen and begun to appear with greater 
frequency, Congress had to recognize that a war had begun. On June 2, Congress 
resolved that all ties to the British Army and Navy be cut off, resolving that no one in 
America should give any orders to British soldiers; that no one should supply the British 
military with goods; and that no one should supply any British ship carrying military men 
or supplies should be aided or supplied with provisions. Through this provision, 
Congress essentially extended the parameters of their boycott of things British to 
include the British military. This was a substantial, but necessary step, for the colonies 
could not continue relations with a military that was actively fighting them.  
The provision of crucial supplies to the Continental army and colonial militias took 
on great importance from 1775 to 1776, continuing throughout the war. On June 10, 
Congress made a number of recommendations to its member colonies concerning 
Saltpeter and Brimstone, advising them to transmit all current supplies to the Provincial 
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Conventions in New York and Pennsylvania, as well as to ready the powder mills 
throughout the colonies for the manufacture of gun powder “for the use of the 
Continent.” All Saltpeter and brimstone collected in the pursuance of these objects 
would “be paid for out of the Continental Fund.”226 Throughout the succeeding years, 
Congress would repeatedly provide for the greater production or supply of gunpowder to 
combat the shortages they continually faced. There was only one gunpowder mill in the 
colonies as of May 1775, at the Frankford Mill in Pennsylvania.227 Congress made 
several inducements to encourage the production and procurement of saltpeter and 
brimstone, including adjusting the rules of the Continental Association and appointing a 
secret committee to import 500 tons of gunpowder.228 Shortages of crucial materials 
made it appear more and more necessary for Congress to declare independence and 
end its trade restrictions so it could open up American ports to the world and supply the 
colonies with the imports it desperately needed to fight a war. Congress also faced 
shortages of cloth; on March 21, 1776, they recommended to the colonies that they 
promote the cultivation and procurement of hemp, flax, cotton, and wool.229 By May 
1776, John Adams could be heard complaining of no fewer than twelve items that the 
colonies were in desperate need of to fight the war: “Salt Petre, Sulphur, Flynts[sic], 
Lead, Cannon, Mortars, Ball, Shells, Musquetts[sic], and Powder,” as well as bayonets 
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and iron/iron ore,230 were all complained of by members of Congress. This shortage of 
so many necessities was one of a number of influences that made independence more 
prudent for Congress, when it hadn’t been before, because of the transition from 
sporadic fighting to continual fighting. 
Throughout the war, Congress would use recommendations to direct the troops 
of colonial militias and ensure the defense of the colonies. On June 19th, Congress 
requested the Governor of Connecticut and the Colony of Rhode Island to send all 
military men raised in the colony to combine forces with the troops in Boston.231 On 
June 23rd, they recommended that New York include in its army “those called Green 
Mountain Boys,” a militia group, to help defend the American colonies. On September 
20th, Congress resolved that the President of Congress should direct New York to send 
forward the troops under General Schuyler’s command.232 Another time, Congress 
directed New York to construct defenses along the Hudson River and obstruct British 
navigation of the river.233 On July 18th, it was recommended that all colonists between 
the ages of 16 and 50 form themselves into militia companies to help defend America 
against British invasion, each of whom would be furnished with a musket. They also 
followed this with a host of recommendations to the colonies to help ensure their safety 
and prevent invasion. These resolutions explicitly provided for keeping already-formed 
militias under the direction of the body that raised them.234 On July 19th, they then 
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requested that the colonies fill out the ranks of the militias being raised in their 
colonies.235 Congress consistently implored the colonies to do things, including raise 
companies and regiments of soldiers, but could do nothing more than make 
recommendations that they hoped would be followed by the colonies in good faith. 
Indeed, on October 15, 1775, the Congress “earnestly recommended….all persons, 
who are possessed of the salt-petre lately removed from Turtle Bay….forthwith to send 
the same to the president of the Convention on New York, to be manufactured into 
gunpowder for the use of the Continental army.”236 If it was of vital importance to the 
war effort that saltpeter be collected so it could be manufactured into gunpowder for the 
army, Congress would be commanding these things, and enforcing these provisions on 
the colonists, instead of earnestly recommending them. This underscored the lack of 
Congressional authority over the people of the colonies. At this point, Congress almost 
entirely relied on the local militias to defend the colonies, rather than a standing army 
like Britain, which also comported with their criticism of Britain for keeping up a standing 
army that appeared in the Declaration of Independence. 
Sometimes, Congressional recommendations would involve very specific 
requests concerning the internal policing of the colony. On October 6, 1775, Congress 
advised the colonial assemblies or other bodies “That it be recommended….to arrest 
and secure every person in their respective colonies, whose going at large may in their 
opinion may in their opinion endanger the safety of the colony, or the liberties of 
America [emphasis added].”237 If Congress had had the authority to command the 
colonies and bind them, then by this provision they would be claiming a nearly unlimited 
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extent of authority—the ability to arrest someone for their political affiliation, or lack of 
vigor in one’s affiliation with the right cause. By such a resolution they were making an 
explicit recommendation to the colonies and thus giving their imprimatur to any colony 
that did this, rather than make a claim for the kind of expansive authority they were 
castigating Great Britain for claiming and exercising without the colonists’ consent. 
Later, on January 2, 1776, Congress, feeling a need to combat the efforts of those 
people who endeavored to curtail American liberty by joining with the British oppressor 
to secure rewards or status from the administration, recommended that colonial 
committees disarm enemies to American liberty or take them into custody, expanding 
on their October 6th resolution.238 On March 14, 1776, the Congress again 
recommended to the assembles to disarm all those who were “notoriously disaffected to 
the cause of America, or who have not associated, and shall refuse to associate to 
defend by arms these United Colonies” and transfer the weapons to the Continental 
army.239 On March 20, 1776, they added the provision that all arms unfit for military 
service were to held by the committees of safety until Congress directed them to be 
returned.240  
 When it came to the Continental Association, the major achievement of the First 
Continental Congress, Congress’s direct control was still minimal. On November 1, 
1775, the Congress resolved to ban the export of produce and livestock from the 
colonies until March 1, 1776. In doing so, however, they allowed for each colony’s 
committee of inspection and observation to permit the export of goods under the 
committee’s direction. This meant that the local committees of inspection, for all 
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practical purposes, had full control over the importation and exportation of goods, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Continental Association. They also proceeded to 
ban the export of rice, which had been an exception under the Continental Association 
agreement.241 On April 13, 1776, a minimum price control was set for “Bohea tea” at ¾ 
dollar per pound, with other teas to be regulated at prices determined by the colonies, to 
prevent traders from taking advantage of the “excessive prices” that might be 
demanded in a time of scarcity.242 This would seem to be an overstep, unless taken as 
a supplement to the existing Continental Association. If so, this was only a new 
guideline for the locally based Continental Association members to carry into effect 
according to their own conscience. 
At times, the rules Congress set for the Continental Army would get them into 
trouble with the colonies, potentially upsetting the unity Congress was trying to foster. 
On November 4, 1775, they recommended to the colonial legislatures that they pass a 
law punishing those who harbored deserters from the army, suggesting fines ranging 
from thirty to fifty dollars, or a whipping (up to thirty nine lashes) if they could not pay. 
They also agreed to pay five dollars (plus expenses) to anyone who caught a deserter. 
Additionally, they provided that the commanding officers of the Continental army take 
precedence over the officers of provincial forces.243 This last resolution was certainly a 
practical one, but this was problematic since it abrogated the authority of the colonial 
militia’s commanding officers over their men. Hence, on December 7, they made sure to 
clear up any misgivings about the resolution: 
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Whereas doubts may arise respecting the true intent and construction of a 
certain resolution of Congress, passed the 4th day of November last, 
empowering the general, in case the necessity of the service should 
require it, to call forth the minutemen and militia of the New England 
colonies. 
Resolved, That the said resolution shall not extend or be construed to 
authorise the general to call forth the said minute men or militia, without 
having applied to and obtain the consent of those officers, in whom the 
executive powers of government in those colonies may be vested.244 
By this clarification, it was clear that Congress did not intend to overstep their 
bounds by declaring the Continental Army to be superior in the chain of 
command by fiat. Congress’s direction of colonial militiamen was wholly 
dependent upon the consent of militia officers or the colonial executive. 
 Congress would also make direct appeals to the people of the colonies using 
recommendations. On December 4, 1775, they resolved “That it be and it is hereby 
recommended to the inhabitants of the colony of Virginia, to resist to the utmost the 
arbitrary government intended to be established therein, by their governor lord 
Dunmore.”245 Lord Dunmore had, of late, instituted martial law in Virginia, declaring 
American Revolutionaries as traitors to the Crown and encouraging slaves to revolt 
against their masters and join the British cause.246 Edmund Pendleton called Dunmore’s 
proclamation of May 6th “Waste Paper, or a mere Subject of Ridicule,” which had 
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insisted that Virginians oppose Patrick Henry and his followers.247 This tactic, of 
undermining of patriot opposition through what could be called “underhanded” methods, 
was controversial in the colonies and played a role in pushing them toward 
independence—it even became a grievance listed in the Declaration of 
Independence.248 
At times the colonies specifically asked for the guidance of Congress on a 
number of issues. On each occasion, Congress took this request as an opportunity to 
give sound recommendations, not as a license to enlarge the bounds of its delegated 
authority. For instance, because Congress took the lead in establishing the Continental 
Association, the colonies sought the advice of Congress when they found the initial 
guidance provided by the Congressional resolutions to be lacking. On September 15, 
1775, delegates from Georgia asked Congress what their colony should do with two 
vessels that had arrived bearing goods from Britain, which they had stored while waiting 
for a response from their solicitation of Congress for advice. Congress resolved that the 
Georgia Convention should ask the proprietors if they’d rather have the goods sent back 
or sold at auction, with any surplus being kept by the Georgia Convention.249 On April 
30, 1776, Congress responded to a request made by the committee of inspection of 
Philadelphia, who sought their advice on the continuance of the price controls on goods 
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other than tea, which related to the ninth article of the Continental Association. 
Congress responded that this article was temporary in nature and only concerned the 
goods then on hand, which had by then been sold or otherwise disposed of. Therefore, 
under the current circumstances where trading carried a greater risk, such a price 
control would be an undue burden, and ought to cease.250 
The colonies would also seek the advice of Congress when dealing with certain 
prisoners captured during the war. On October 28th, Congress resolved, after 
Pennsylvania asked for direction on the matter, to keep those men who came in on the 
Rebecca and Francis transport in whatever jails the committee desired, with the men 
receiving a subsistence out of the Continental Treasury. The men had been sent with 
instructions from General Gage to attract recruits by offering men “grants of forfeited 
lands,”251 and had been captured by Pennsylvania. 
Colonies would even ask for direction on setting up new governments. On June 
2nd, 1775, a letter to Congress from Massachusetts was read, which detailed their 
desire for Congressional guidance on the “taking up and exercising the Powers of civil 
Government,” and agreeing to submit to any plan the Congress should come up with for 
them. One week later, Congress resolved that the colonists did not owe obedience to 
the acts of Parliament that altered the Charter of Massachusetts, nor did they owe 
obedience to the Governor of Lieutenant Governor who would thereby subvert the true 
charter, building on their criticism from the First Congress. They then boldly declared 
the office of Governor and Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts vacant, advising the 
Provincial Convention of Massachusetts to have the people choose representatives to 
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an assembly or council who could administer the government until the King chose a 
Governor that agreed to abide by the charter of Massachusetts.252 This bold move 
represented not an incursion on the American colonists, however, but the British, since 
these were provincial positions. Still, such a proclamation was still an extremely defiant 
act for a Congress that, if they got involved in the affairs of a colony, usually stuck to 
recommendations. Nonetheless, through the early part of 1776, Congress did not take 
any more radical of a stance on acts of Parliament than it did in the First Congress; 
Congress named the offending acts on multiple occasions, asked for their repeal, and 
declared them to be against the British constitution during the First Congress too. The 
only difference was that Congress was much more deliberate and careful in making 
those determinations in the First Congress, whereas now it was almost reflexive, and 
could be done without much ado. 
Not only did Congress give advice to Massachusetts’ internal government at the 
colony’s request, but they did this for other states too. On November 3, 1775, Congress 
recommended that the provincial Convention of New Hampshire call a convention of the 
people to establish a government that could secure their safety, peace, and happiness 
during the hostilities with Great Britain. They did this because part of the instructions of 
the delegates asked for the direction of Congress “with respect to a method for our 
administering justice, and regulating our civil police.” Later, they would make the same 
recommendation to South Carolina, which asked for similar advice on how to govern 
their colony during hostilities with Britain, and then Virginia.253  
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3.3 Independence & Classical Republicanism 
John Adams first argued for American independence in a July 6, 1775 letter to 
James Warren, pointing out that the the idea that Parliament would turn around and 
reconcile on account of the resolve of the Americans was farfetched. For the first time, 
Adams argued that the colonies should “immediately….dissolve all Ministerial 
Tyrannies, and Custom houses, set up Governments of our own, like that of 
Connecticut in the Colonies, and confederate together like an indissoluble Band, for 
mutual defence and open our Ports to all Nations immediately.” Jefferson’s Declaration 
of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms had radically shifted his view toward 
independence, which had been passed earlier that day, though he still thought “the 
Colonies are not yet ripe for it.”254 
John Dickinson was one the of most consistent moderates, even as the debate 
for independence was all but decided in July of 1776. Dickinson was concerned that the 
colonists should not prepare for war without continued petitioning, or trying to send 
agents to negotiate, because he thought it would bring the full brunt of the British army 
on the colonies faster than it would if they did do those things, regardless of whether 
Congress’ intention was truly to reconcile.  Dickinson used as evidence of their firmness 
speeches given by General Burgoyne, Captain Harvey, Sir William Meredith, Lord 
North, and Sir William Mayne, all of whom indicated their willingness to spill American 
blood and expend British life to preserve the very existence of Britain (showing how 
grave they thought this American rebellion was to the empire) and pass down the British 
constitution unscathed to posterity. Dickinson also pointed out that “Almost the whole 
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landed Interest [was] now against [America],” not to mention much of the masses in 
Britain. It was only “The Dissenters—parts of the Traders & Manufacturers immediately 
concerned in our Commerce—and the small Band of independent virtuous Spirits in the 
Kingdom,” that were on the side of America, which counted for very little. He also said 
that standing firm as the last Congress did was a miscalculation that did not produce 
immediate redress as some members of Congress thought it would. The only way to 
secure redress by standing form would be if the Ministry were changed, which was 
unpredictable. As such, it was important to petition the king not while vindicating 
American rights, but by complaining about the recent system of colonial administration, 
which was a more defensible claim on which to base their petition. Nothing has shaken 
Dickinson’s view that only continued dependence on Britain would secure America’s 
happiness in the foreseeable future. The Crown has always had the power to regulate 
trade of the colonies, including taxing them; it arose out of the nature of the British 
constitution and our settlement under Britain’s protection. Nevertheless, Dickinson was 
wholly against the Intolerable Acts: “For my part my Sentiments & Resolutions are 
decisive—to endure all the Extremities of even an unsuccessful War rather than 
sacrifice the Constitution of that generous, glorious Colony [Massachusetts].” The whole 
world must see that America did everything it could to avoid war, Dickinson thought.255 It 
was essentially the design of Congress, then, to petition the king a second time, 
committing fully to the war if there was a negative response but holding if it elicited a 
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positive response and reconciliation was possible.256 It was strategically important to 
delay Britain while the time she considered the petition, during which the colonies could 
get better situated for war.257 Archibald Bullock and William Houstoun of Georgia, to put 
the matter starkly, were in favor of all out war if petition not answered affirmatively.258 
Members of Congress still felt the American colonies had much more to gain 
from a reconciliation with Britain than they did becoming fully independent and outside 
of the protection of Britain. As James Duane put it, the fighting should always be for 
self-preservation, not revenge, conquest, or independence—it was still a “family quarrel” 
and reconciliation should always be kept in mind.259 Nonetheless, members of 
Congress insisted that peace and reconciliation with Britain were desirable only so long 
as they could therein secure their liberties on a lasting basis. Congress, especially in 
1776, began producing more radical measures that led them to independence in 
reaction to the evaporating prospects of reconciliation with Britain. 
All the while, Congress had to maintain unity among the colonies too. Congress’s 
appointment of George Washington as general of the Continental army had to be 
understood within that context. It was politically important to keep the union intact and 
not have the army dominated by New Englanders, which could make Southerners feel 
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less involved or as if they had little influence in affairs, as multiple Congressmen 
attested.260  
Appointments to leadership revealed colonists’ inherent belief in classical 
republican values. This proved especially pertinent when discussing the continental 
army’s commander in chief, who they appointed George Washington. Many members of 
Congress wanted, besides someone capable of aiding political unity, someone who 
possessed virtuous qualities that made a good and virtuous leader. As John Adams 
wrote to Elbridge Gerry, George Washington fit the bill because he was disinterested, a 
quality universally regarded as indicative of virtue. Washington’s thoughts were clearly 
not with financial gain, as he left a comfortable retirement and prosperous farm to 
become a general in the Continental Army, making an enormous sacrifice for the 
country.261 Others echoed that sentiment, consistently praising his modesty and 
virtue,262 but also that he was “sinsible [sic], amiable,....& brave.”263 The issue of 
modesty was very important; any time a Congressman was elected or chosen for an 
important position, modesty required that they humbly suggested the position required 
greater skills or abilities than that which they possessed, refusing the position at first 
blush. They also had to insist that they never sought the position, but were offered it. 
Samuel Adams, in a letter to his wife, took pains to explain that he was not trying to get 
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elected to the legislature of his home state: “My Constituents do as they please, and so 
they ought. I never intrigud [sic] for their Suffrages, and I never will.” This was followed 
closely by modesty about his abilities: “I heartily wish I could serve them better.”264 In 
letters to multiple recipients, Washington himself said that his abilities weren’t adequate 
to the service they asked. Washington’s indication that he did not seek the position, like 
Adams’, was a way to prove his disinterestedness. As was always the case, however, 
having received the appointment, Washington believed it would have brought him 
dishonor to reject the appointment, so he accepted. 265 John Adams, likewise, 
disavowed any ambitions to be elected to office.266 
John Adams, in particular, echoed suchclassical republican understandings of 
virtue and the public good and was extraordinarily sensitive about these issues. Talking 
about military pay, Adams said that New Englanders were fine with lower pays because 
of their favorability toward equality, while others who “had a great opinion of the high 
importance of a continental general….were determined to place him in an elevated point 
of light” by granting high salaries, as they desired for General Washington.267 Adams 
even thought that only a virtuous people could be free: “The only foundation of a free 
Constitution, is pure Virtue, and if this cannot be inspired into our People, in a greater 
Measure, than they have it now, They may change their Rulers, and the forms of 
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Government, but they will not obtain a lasting Liberty. They will only exchange Tyrants 
and Tyrannies.” Virtue, to Adams, meant striving against “Envy, Pride, Vanity, Malice, 
[and] Revenge.”268 
These republicans had their own understanding of what it meant to be a 
statesman. Elbridge Gerry, reflecting on this understanding, said that “The Trust 
reposed in me by the public was for the purpose of promoting the public Good, & 
the Salus populi is the object at which alone I mean to aim in conducting the 
Affairs of the public.” The public good was crucial to republican notions of good 
government, especially in times of war, where unity and a spirit of promoting a 
collective good are intertwined.269 John Adams indicated in multiple letters, upon 
the passing of Dr. Joseph Warren, that it was sweet to die for one’s country, in 
the service of a worthy public good, as did other members of Congress; in this 
case, that worthy public good was American liberty.270 
The colonists essentially believed in a science of government that would 
protect rights and promote the public good. In this science,  both reason and 
experience combined to answer the difficult questions concerning law, justice, 
political philosophy, and society. They could answer, therefore, that “If then a 
Business or Act is to be done in the Executive Department for which a Reward is 
to be granted, that Reward is always in a just Government determined previous 
to the Appointment of the Officer….& made adequate to the Services to be done 
                                               
268 John Adams to Zabdiel Adams, Philadelphia, June 21, 1776  in Smith, Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 4:278-279.  
269 Samuel Ward to George Washington, Philadelphia, September 17, 1775, in Smith, 
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 2:26-27.  
270 John Adams to James Warren, Philadelphia, July 6, 1775, in Smith, Letters of 
Delegates to Congress, 1:588-589. 
 
 
 
120 
as well or equal on the part of the Government.” It had proved all too true, from 
both logic and experience, that to do differently would invite corruption, from thee 
Americans’ experience with the British ministry. Hence, it was dishonorable to 
accept a position that didn’t comport with this principle, said Gerry.271 
Disinterestedness was one of the chief virtues for a good statesman in 
order that they could pursue the public good. The relationship of 
disinterestedness and modesty to public virtue was universally regarded by 
members of Congress, and a language they all spoke and understood.272 Lee 
talked about “interested” men trying to “obstruct the public service” in the creation 
and administration of the new state governments.273According to Samuel Adams, 
“It behooves our Friends therefore to be very circumspect, and in all their Publick 
Conduct to convince the World, that they are influenced not by partial or private 
Motives but altogether with a View of promoting the publick Welfare.”274 
Undoubtedly, many Americans took this idea of a public good or the value of 
supporting the common cause for granted, resulting in substantial unity among 
the colonists in what was practically a civil war. John Adams applied this 
understanding of disinterestedness to all of government, including the judiciary. It 
was of supreme importance that there were independent judges whose 
commissions and tenure did not depend on the will of the king. “There is nothing 
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of more importance than this: bit yet there is nothing less likely to be done,” 
Adams said dismayed;275 Adams knew from experience the problems that 
attended a judicial system of dependent judges, who were led to acting as a third 
arm of the king rather than impartial arbiters.  
Some members of Congress thought that religious figures had no place in 
politics. John Adams recounted how he wished John Zubly of Georgia would be 
the first and last clergyman to enter Congress, regretting the “Mixing the sacred 
Character, with that of the Statesman,” since most clergymen knew too little 
about world affairs and business.276 
On rare occasions, members of Congress would pontificate on more 
abstract subjects such as the nature of government and power. In only two 
instances in the letters of members of Congress between May of 1775 and 
August of 1776 did they delve into these deep issues at length, as an exercise in 
political philosophy, more or less divorced from the exigencies of war; once it 
was John Adams and the other was James Duane. “The only moral Foundation 
of Government is the Consent of the People,” said Adams. Asking whence the 
right of a majority to govern a minority arises, given that actual, universal consent 
was impossible to obtain, Adams said that government ought to run society by 
the mechanics of principles and maxims, as an army governs its soldiers. Citing 
James Harrington, Adams asserted “that Power always follows Property,” 
meaning the balance of power must be skewed toward men of property. But, to 
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prevent corruption, there must not be restrictions on the ability of everyone to 
acquire land so that “the multitude” can gain their own interest in government and 
obtain a just the balance of power. Adams thought there must be a property 
qualification to vote, though not too rigid. Such a qualification would ensure, just 
as a voting age of twenty one ensures that the public can trust the general 
knowledge of the voter, that an individual has a generally sufficient stake in 
society so as not to be subject to another’s will. This was classical republicanism 
at its core, and an expression quite out of the ordinary for a Congress dedicated 
to practical concerns.277 
James Duane, on the other hand, launched into his analysis for slightly more 
practical reasons. Duane was intimately concerned about the prospect of men of 
independent means and property losing control of the reigns of government during the 
tumult of the war. They not only had to fear losing control of civil government to the 
British ministry, but also to those who had more revolutionary ambitions. 
Licentiousness is the natural Effect of a civil discord and it can only be guarded 
against by placing the Command of the Troops in the hands of Men of property 
and Rank who, by that means, will preserve the same Authority over the Minds of 
the people which they enjoyed in the Hour of Tranquility.278 
This was a central feature of the republicanism identified by Bernard Bailyn in the 
Revolutionary pamphlets leading up to the war—a paranoia that “the fear of conspiracy 
against constituted authority was built into the very structure of politics.” This fear of “a 
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comprehensive conspiracy against liberty throughout the English-speaking world”279 
became, for men like Duane, a fear that those without property would themselves 
conspire to use the tumult of revolution to overthrow the existing order and create a 
democratic society. While for Duane this issue was a core concern, it was a concern 
rarely voiced in Congress or their letters, and likely took a back seat to other issues, 
since the American Revolution, no less than the Constitution, was not a conspiracy to 
protect wealthy landowners.280 
*** 
On May 10, 1776 Congress recommended to all the colonies that they adopt a 
government capable of handling the exigencies of the conflict, if none existed.281 John 
Adams, just after it had been adopted, admitted that the colonies should have 
recommended this a year ago, which would’ve benefited the colonies greatly.282 Robert 
Morris, Caesar Rodney, and Elbridge Gerry each attributed the desire of all men in the 
colonies to form new governments to the king’s proclamation that there could be no 
peace except under submission.283 Many congressmen spoke excitedly about the 
resolution, thinking it truly revolutionary; governments, founded in compact, would truly 
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be instituted for the first time, with real, rather than imagined, consent.284 Indeed, some 
members of Congress considered it, or the May 15th resolution, a preamble designed to 
explain the necessity of the May 10th resolution, on par with a declaration of 
independence.285  James Duane, for instance, was apprehensive about the apparent 
move by Congress for independence, which he thought might alienate moderate 
colonies like Pennsylvania and Maryland.286 Thomas Stone, too, thought the move was 
rash and bound to bring a new relation between Britain and America of “Conqueror & 
vanquished.”287  
Well before Thomas Jefferson submitted his draft of the Declaration of 
Independence on June 7, most Congress thought it was a foregone conclusion. In May 
of 1776, only sneaking doubts that perhaps independence might be staved off remained 
for a few members; even then, they only had reservations about declaring 
independence, thinking it likely.288 As Elbridge Gerry wrote, “All are sensible of the 
perfidy of Great Britain, and are convinced there is no medium between unqualified 
submission and actual independency….A final declaration is approaching with great 
rapidity.”289 Independence was the next obvious step, according to Francis Lightfoot 
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Lee.290 On May 15, the Virginia convention resolved and sent instructions to the Virginia 
delegates that the colonies should declare themselves independent, which agreed with 
the sentiments of North Carolina. Because of this, Elbridge Gerry wrote that with the 
opinions of North Carolina and Virginia explicitly in favor of independence, Congress 
must soon follow.291 By this point, John Adams was proselytizing heavily for 
independence, writing that the colonies would even be justified of invading Britain, if it 
were practicable: “The Policy of Rome, in carrying their Arms to Carthage, while 
Hannibal was at the Gates of their Capitol, was wise and justified by the Event, and 
would deserve Imitation if We could march into the Country of our Enemies.”292 
As it turned out, May 15th was a fateful day for the Revolution. On that day, 
Congress drafted the preamble to their resolution to the colonies to erect new 
governments, Virginia instructed its delegates to persuade Congress to declare 
independence, and even recalcitrant Maryland “abolish[ed] the oaths of allegiance” to 
Britain they had previously required of their representatives.293 In June 1776, delegates 
from Virginia moved for independence and dissolving political ties with Britain, 
requesting the formation of a confederation of colonies. Against the motion for 
independence were James Wilson, Robert Livingston, Edward Rutledge, and John 
Dickinson. While they were not against independence per se, they argued that it was 
not the right time for independence, and that some of their instructions instructed them 
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to disapprove of any resolution for independence, as James Wilson’s did. This was a 
striking difference than what would have been argued one year earlier; even the 
greatest opponents of radical measures said they “were friends to the measures 
themselves.” It was not yet the time avowed treason, they thought, so long as the 
middle colonies were still cold to independence. Congress’ delegation should follow that 
of the states, and a secession of one or more colonies from the whole would be 
disastrous to the union. If the middle colonies were upset by the May 15th resolution, 
how could Congress move to declare independence? In addition, they thought 
confederacy should precede independence.294 Dickinson continued to vainly believe 
that reconciliation was possible, when all others had given up in it, thinking it “may 
perhaps be in a Year or two.” Dickinson also thought it would be better to conceal the 
desire for independence if that was their aim, rather than unite Britain against them and 
renew her vigor with a declaration: “England, Holland & the Empire acknowledged the 
Duke of Anjou King of Spain while arming to dethrone him,” he said. Edward Rutledge 
also warned broadcasting their intentions: “giving our Enemy Notice of our Intentions 
before we had taken any Steps to execute them.” Rutledge, unlike Dickinson, was 
doubtful that moderates in Congress could oppose the tide of independence.295 
For the resolution were John Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and George Wythe. 
They argued that the commencement of hostilities had dissolved their federal 
connection with Britain. We declared allegiance to the king, they said, but after the 
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commencement of hostilities, the colonies no longer owed him allegiance. Contrary to 
those against the measure, they declared that the people wanted Congress to “lead the 
way.” Regardless of what some representatives of the colonies felt about the measure, 
the voice of the people was what mattered, and they supported it, they argued. Also 
contrary to what those against said, “the history of the Dutch revolution, of whom three 
states only confederated at first proved that a secession of some colonies would not be 
so dangerous as some apprehended.” John Adams had his own peculiar list of 
advantages a Declaration would bring to the united colonies:  
The Advantages, which will result from Such a Declaration, are in my 
opinion very numerous, and very great. After that Event, the Colonies will 
hesitate no longer to compleat [sic] their Government. They will establish 
Tests and ascertain the Criminality of Toryism. The Presses will produce 
no more Seditious, or traiterous [sic] Speculations. Slanders upon public 
Men and Measures will be lessened. The Legislatures of the Colonies will 
exert themselves, to manufacture Salt Petre, Sulphur, Powder, Arms, 
Cannon, Mortars, Cloathing [sic], and every Thing, necessary for the 
Support of Life.296 
Lastly, it was crucial for the colonies that trade be reopened again with the world, which 
they could do in independence.297 
According to Jefferson, in the early debates it was New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina who were apprehensive about 
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independence, and because of their apprehension, decision on a declaration ought to 
be postponed until July 1. In the meantime, a committee would be appointed to declare 
independence consisting of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, Robert 
Livingston, and Thomas Jefferson. The committee ultimately tasked Jefferson to write 
the Declaration, which he submitted to the committee on June 28th, 1776.298 Hoping to 
make a last ditch effort to stop independence, on June 29th, Edward Rutledge entreated 
John Jay to be present during the coming week, in which “A Declaration of 
Independence, the Form of a Confederation of these Colonies, and a Scheme for a 
Treaty with foreign Powers will be laid before the House.” Rutledge wanted them each 
there so that they could “oppose the first, and infuse Wisdom into the others.”299 
When July 1st came around, a resolution for the Declaration of Independence 
was put to a vote in a committee of whole. South Carolina and Pennsylvania voted 
against it (with Pennsylvania’s delegates acknowledging its votes were against the 
wishes of the people), while New York could not cast a vote because of its instructions, 
which did not give them specific authority to vote for independence, and Delaware’s 
delegation was divided on the question. South Carolina would vote for it the next day, 
after Edward Rutledge of South Carolina had voted to postpone it until July 2nd, 
reversing its position from the previous day. Both Pennsylvania and Delaware were also 
able to change their vote from no and divided, respectively, to yes because of the arrival 
of additional delegates in favor, leading to a vote of twelve colonies in favor of the 
Declaration, with none against (New York did not vote), making it a unanimous 
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Declaration.300 After the Declaration, the New York delegates, George Clinton, Henry 
Wisner, John Alsop, William Floyd, and Francis Lewis, asked their colony to consider 
itself bound by the vote for independency in Congress, because the delegates thought it 
crucial that Congress continue on with the war effort, with the sustained unanimity of the 
thirteen colonies unperturbed. New York would approve on July 9th of the measure for 
independence.301 
Debate on the specific provisions in the Declaration went on until July 4th, with a 
number of notable passages being eliminated, including the clause in Jefferson’s draft 
that concerned censuring Britain for enslaving Africans. South Carolina and Georgia 
each moved strongly in favor of its removal, since they wanted the importation of slaves 
to continue; even some Northern colonies were sensitive to the issue since they were 
often the largest slave traders and carriers.302 The final declaration was approved on the 
morning of July 4th, and naturally validated the synthesis of natural law and 
constitutionalism; by the time the Declaration came around, there was little argument 
over the source of American rights: all had been firmly established under Congressional 
precedent. Early on in the document, it was a clear validation of natural law thinking, in 
which Jefferson wrote about “the laws of nature and of nature’s god,” and “inalienable 
rights,” or rights which individuals cannot consent to give up when consenting to 
governments—something that one would not find in the tradition of British 
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constitutionalism, wherein a government could be absolutist if the people consented to 
it.  
In any event, Jefferson spoke to both the constitutionalist and natural law 
traditions when he described how people instituted governments, essentially leaving the 
state of nature, and mentioned that the principle of consent was the foundation of the 
social contract, which was also the foundation of British Constitutionalism, as the 
colonists argued all along. In addition, Jefferson’s mention that people had a right of 
revolution, where people have a right “to alter or abolish” a government that no longer 
functioned to protect rights, was a position that would have found a more natural home 
in natural law thinking than constitutionalism, which was far less open to this sort of 
radical change. Nonetheless, Jefferson nodded in the direction of conservative 
constitutionalists when he argued that “Prudence indeed will dictate that governments 
long established should not be changed for light & transient causes”; only “when a long 
train of abuses and usurpations pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design 
to reduce them under absolute despotism” did it make sense for the people to make use 
of this radical right. In listing the “long train of abuses and usurpations,” Jefferson, 
though he didn’t say it, used the familiar American understanding of the British 
Constitution to find grievances with Britain when it issued oppressive acts the colonists 
did not consent to, and when there were rights they had been owed under the British 
constitution but denied.  
In addition, Jefferson used a Republican understanding of the science of 
government to identify government actions by Britain that wrought mischief and the 
general corruption that Americans felt infested Britain that led to such misbehavior. A 
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government that “kept among us in times of peace standing armies without the consent 
of our legislatures” was one that would not promote the public good; nor was it good 
government to make “judges dependant on his [Majesty’s] will alone, for the tenure of 
their offices, & the amount & paiment [sic] of their salaries; the same went for 
“quartering large bodies of armed troops among” colonial homes, “for cutting off our 
trade with all parts of the world,” and “for imposing taxes on us without out consent.”  
The Declaration, then, represented the pinnacle of the blending of natural law 
and constitutionalist thinking; it located the ultimate source of man’s rights in his 
humanity, but looked to the science of government, or the combination of reason and 
practical experience, to determine and list what acts were oppressive. In the principle of 
consent, both natural law and British constitutionalism had a natural harmony, as 
showcased in the Declaration. 
The immediate significance of the Declaration to many Congressmen was 
unparalleled. Hancock called the Declaration “the Ground & Foundation of a future 
Government,” which he thought would soon follow with a confederation.303 Congress 
immediately set to work on a seal of the United States, which it felt was necessary for 
legitimacy, of its future actions, diplomatic relations, and for the Declaration of 
Independence itself, not signed until August 2nd.304 Samuel Adams thought the delay in 
the issuance of a Declaration meant losing the possibility of being allied with Canada, 
which at this point was lost.305 
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4 CONCLUSION 
The American Revolution was at least a revolution in ideas, both social and 
political, resulting in a distinctive tradition of American thought. Broadly speaking, this 
change resulted in a synthesis of natural law and British constitutionalism. It is important 
to realize that this synthesis was possible because of the overlap between the two 
traditions as they were understood by Americans, not because they shared a single 
foundation. As such, it should be recognized that this understanding was pluralistic; 
though the traditions were combined and reinforced each other in the minds of many 
Americans, they were also distinct to them. This can easily be seen through the debates 
among members of Congress and their diaries, recollections, and letters from the 
period, where members argued for one tradition or the other, usually exclusively. 
However, the nature of the political situation—external to Congress with Britain, and 
internal by the need to maintain a unified consensus as often as possible—meant that it 
was necessary for Congress to compromise and embrace each tradition, doing their 
best to reconcile them. Americans certainly had an enlarged sense of their rights, 
embracing radical thought far more than their conservative British counterparts—an 
irreverent radicalism more favorable to natural law and experimentalism in society and 
government. But, they had a healthy respect for history and tradition as a way of 
demonstrating what worked in the past, and what didn't—the accumulated experimental 
results of human experience; hence, their gravitation to British constitutionalism as well, 
in its whiggish variant.  
This combination was not created in a vacuum—it had to be refined in the 
generations leading up to the Revolutionary War. And because experience had yet to 
provide an experiential proving-ground for a government truly founded on consent and 
 
 
 
133 
designed explicitly to protect natural rights, it took a “long train of abuses,” beginning in 
the decade or so before the First Congress and accelerating in frequency and severity 
before members of Congress were willing to take a revolutionary step, declaring their 
independence and establishing the foundation of their rights in both reason and 
experience: natural law and British constitutionalism.  
The Intolerable Acts caused the colonies to meet at the First Congress in the first 
place. The closure of the port of Boston and the reorganization of the Massachusetts 
government without their consent was a substantial grievance that they looked upon 
with great opprobrium and were willing to go to extralegal means to secure redress. 
Members of Congress came into Congress with specific delegations of authority, as well 
as practical limitations on what they could agree to. They were often limited to securing 
redress of grievances, which meant they could only go so far in their radicalism. Shortly 
after they began sitting in Congress, the Powder Alarm, followed shortly by the Suffolk 
Resolves, radicalized the Congress. Committed to radicalism, they issued the 
Declaration of Rights and Grievances, in which they established the foundation of their 
rights as both natural law and the British Constitution. This synthesis was necessary 
because of Congress’ desire to maintain unity as well as not limit their ability to secure 
redress by only choosing one source or another.  
After the First Congress concluded, and shortly before the Second Congress 
met, open hostilities broke out at Lexington and Concord, which many members of 
Congress thought meant would make redress more difficult. The outbreak of hostilities 
meant Congress concerned itself more with the war effort in a day to day basis. As 
petitions to the King failed, and the British began escalating the war, including acting in 
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ways that made the colonists feel like the British were trying to oppress them rather than 
seek reconciliation, more reticent members of Congress began thinking reconciliation 
was hopeless. In the Spring of 1776, with the failure of the Canada expedition and the 
recent, bloody Battle of Bunker Hill, the time was ripe for more radical steps. Many 
colonies had recently changed their instructions to their delegates and removed the 
limitations that prevented them from seeking independence, and would change them up 
through July of 1776, which was crucial to the two major, radical resolutions they agreed 
to in May and July of 1776. Congress issued a resolution advising the colonies to enact 
new state governments, which many thought was itself a de facto Declaration of 
Independence in May. Two months laters, Congress agreed to the actual Declaration of 
Independence, which would be signed unanimously by the colonies in Congress. 
The Declaration of Independence was this combination of experience and reason 
and cemented the foundation of their rights as a combination of natural law and British 
constitutionalism. But the Declaration and previous Congressional resolutions were 
undoubtedly a product of the circumstances of war: the need to promote unity combined 
with events that increasingly made reconciliation unlikely, producing a unique statement 
of American thought whose importance is arguably unrivaled in the history of the world.  
American thought would continue to develop as the war wore on. Congress 
would agree to the Articles of Confederation in 1778, with the last-needed state 
approving the Articles in 1781, setting off a new system of responsibilities for Congress, 
but also explicitly reserving every other power to the states. In doing so, Congress was 
carrying on the legacy of the revolution, and previous resolutions of Congress, by 
reserving matters of internal policing and taxation to the states, while granting Congress 
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powers concerning issues requiring the unity snd coordination of the states, such as war 
and peace. 
This Confederation was a unique experiment in constitutional governance that 
strictly adhered to the ideals of the Revolution, using reason and experience to design 
something entirely new. Nevertheless, the Articles did not comport entirely to the 
developments discussed in this paper. Both natural law and British constitutionalism did 
not play as large a role in their development as the Declaration did. The Articles were 
crafted against a background of a natural law understanding—they did not want to 
violate natural rights—but themselves had little to do with it. British constitutionalism 
largely served as an example of what to avoid—they did not want a hereditary monarch 
or a Congress that ruled over those without representation—but the confederacy they 
formed was far different than the British system. The U.S. Constitution, with the Bill of 
Rights, would be a closer match to the synthesis of natural law and British 
constitutionalism: it brought back a relatively strong executive, it enlarged the powers of 
Congress, and the Bill of Rights represented the best of the constitutional rights they 
held under Britain and the natural rights individuals possessed prior to government. 
While this is outside the scope of this paper, since it is concerned with the years from 
1774 to 1776, the U.S. Constitution likely went too far back in the direction of the 
enlarged power of government they had despised when Britain had them—though the 
source of this complaint against British was largely that Britain claimed these powers 
over the colonies when the colonies did not or could not have representation was 
largely that they did not or could not have representation, or the means to consent, 
which was not true under the U.S. Constitution. 
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Nevertheless, the Declaration stands as the timeless monument to the American 
fusion of British constitutionalism and natural rights. Because of the lasting impact of the 
Declaration on contemporary American understandings of the Founding Era, it will 
continue to impact American identities in ever-changing ways, both predictable and 
unpredictable. 
  
 
 
 
137 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adair, Douglas. “The Tenth Federalist Revisited” William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. 8, 
no. 1 (January 1951): 48-67.  
Adams, Charles Francis, ed. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the 
United States: with A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, by His Grandson, 
Charles Francis Adams. Volume II. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 
1850. 
Adams, John. Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Edited by Lyman H. 
Butterfield et al. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap 
Press, 1961. 
Adams, Randolph G. The Political Ideas of the American Revolution. Durham, N.C.: 
Trinity College Press, 1922. 
Appleby, Joyce. “Liberalism and the American Revolution.” The New England Quarterly 
49, no. 1 (March 1976): 3-26. 
Appleby, Joyce. “Republicanism and Ideology.” American Quarterly 37, no, 4, 
Republicanism in the History and Historiography of the United States (Autumn 
1985): 461-73. 
Aptheker, Herbert. Early Years of the Republic: From the End of the Revolution to the 
First Administration of Washington (1783-1793). New York: International 
Publishers, 1976. 
Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Bailyn, Bernard. “Political Experience and Enlightenment Ideas in Eighteenth-Century 
America.” American Historical Review 67, no. 2 (January 1962): 339-351. 
Bancroft, George. History of the United States. 10 vols. Boston: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1834-1874. 
Barrow, Thomas C. Trade & Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 
1600-1775. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
Batchellor, Albert Stillman. State of New Hampshire, Town Charters Including Grants of 
Territory with the Present Limits of New Hampshire. Vol 24. Concord: Edward N. 
Pearson, Public Printer, 1894. 
Beard, Charles A. An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. New York: Macmillan, 
1913. 
Becker, Carl L. The Declaration of Independence: A Study on the History of Political 
Ideas. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922. 
Becker, Carl L. History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776. 
Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1909. 
 
 
 
138 
Beer, George Louis. British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1907. 
Boorstin, Daniel J. The Genius of American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1953. 
Brown, Robert E. and B. Katherine. Middle-Class Democracy and the Revolution in 
Massachusetts, 1691-1780. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955.  
Brown, Robert E. and B. Katherine. Virginia, 1705-1786: Democracy or Aristocracy?. 
East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1964. 
Burnett, Edmund C. The Continental Congress. New York: Macmillan Company, 1941. 
Burnett, Edmund C. “The Name ‘United States of America’” The American Historical 
Review 31, no. 1 (October 1925): 79-81. 
Burnett, Edmund C. “Perquisites of the President of the Continental Congress” The 
American Historical Review 35, no. 1 (October 1929): 69-76.  
Burnett, Edmund, ed. Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, Vol. I. August 
29, 1774, to July 4, 1776. Gloucester, Mass. Peter Smith, 1963 [Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1921].  
Cogliano, Francis D. and Kirsten E. Phimister. Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A 
Sourcebook. New York; London: Routledge, 2011. 
Cogliano, Francis D. Revolutionary America 1763-1815: A Political History. London; 
New York: Routledge, 2000. 
Davis, Joseph L. Sectionalism in American Politics, 1774-1787. Madison: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1977. 
Dickerson, Oliver M. The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951. 
Dougherty, Keith L. Collective Action Under the Articles of Confederation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
Ford, Worthington C. et al., eds., Journals of Continental Congress, 1774-1779. 34 vols. 
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1904-37. 
Greene, Jack P. “The Reappraisal of the American Revolution in Recent Historical 
Literature.” In The Reinterpretation of the American Revolution, ed. Jack P. 
Greene, 2-74. New York; Evanston; London: Harper & Row, 1968. 
Greene, Jack P. “The Social Origins of the American Revolution: An Evaluation and 
Interpretation.” Political Science Quarterly 88, no. 1 (March 1973): 1-22. 
Hamilton, Alexander. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge. 
Federal edition. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904. Accessed December 9, 
2015, http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1378/1590430. 
Harper, Lawrence A. “The Effects of the Navigation Acts on the Thirteen Colonies.” In 
The Era of the American Revolution: Studies Inscribed to Evarts Boutell Greene, 
ed. Richard B. Morris, 1-39. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. 
 
 
 
139 
Henderson, H. James. Party Politics in the Continental Congress. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1974. 
Hendrickson, David C. Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding. 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2003. 
Hoffer, Peter Charles. “Will the Real Continental Congress Please Stand Up?” Review 
of King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776 by Jerrilyn 
Greene Marston. Reviews in American History 16, no. 3 (Sep., 1988): 358-361. 
Hofstadter, Richard. “Beard and the Constitution: the History of an Idea.” American 
Quarterly 2, no. 3 (Fall 1950): 195-212. 
Irvin, Benjamin H. “The Attraction of the Continental Congress.” Pennsylvania Legacies 
3, no. 1 (May 2003): 28-29.  
Jensen, Merrill. The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-
Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1940. 
Journals of Congress, containing the Proceedings from Sept. 5, 1774 to Jan. 1, 1776. 
Philadelphia: R. Aitken, Bookseller, Front Street, 1777. 
Katz, Stanley N. “Origins of Constitutional Thought.” Perspectives in American History 3 
(1969): 474-490. 
Kiracofe, David James. “Dr. Benjamin Church and the Dilemma of Treason in 
Revolutionary Massachusetts” New England Quarterly 70, no. 3 (September 
1997): 443-462. 
Lutz, Donald S. “The Articles of Confederation as Background to the Federal Republic.” 
Publius 20, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 55-70. 
Lutz, Donald S. “Why Federalism?,” Review of Collective Action under the Articles of 
Confederation by Keith L. Dougherty; Dreams of a More Perfect Union by Rogan 
Kersh; The Federal Principle in American Politics, 1790-1833 by Andrew C. 
Lenner; States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876 by Forrest 
McDonald. The William and Mary Quarterly 3rd. ser. 61, no. 3 (July 2004): 582-
588. 
Lincoln, Charles H. The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1901. 
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis. London: A. Millar et al., 
1764. 
Main, Jackson Turner. The Social Structure of Revolutionary America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965. 
Marston, Jerrilyn Greene. King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 
1774-1776. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987. 
McDonald, Forrest. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution. 
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985. 
 
 
 
140 
McDonald, Forrest. We The People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1958. 
McLaughlin, Andrew. A Constitutional History of the United States. New York: D. 
Appleton-Century Co., 1935. 
Middlekauff, Robert. The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789. New 
York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Morgan, Edmund S. The Birth of the Republic: 1763-89. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1956. 
Morgan, Edmund S. “American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising.” William and 
Mary Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1957): 3-15. 
Nattels, Curtis P. “British Mercantilism and the Economic Development of the Thirteen 
Colonies.” Journal of Economic History 12, no. 2 (Spring 1952): 105-114. 
Osgood, Herbert Levi. “The American Revolution.” Political Science Quarterly 13, no. 1 
(March 1898): 41-59. 
Parkinson, Robert G. “War and the Imperative of Union.” The William and Mary 
Quarterly 68, no. 4 (October 2011): 631-634. 
Perri, Timothy J. “The Evolution of Military Conscription in the United States” The 
Independent Review 17, no. 3 (Winter 2013): 429-439. 
Rakove, Jack. Review of King and Congress: The Transfer of Political Legitimacy, 
1774-1776 by Jerrilyn Greene Marston; Inventing the People: The Rise of 
Popular Sovereignty in England and America by Edmund S. Morgan, Law and 
History Review 9, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 185-189. 
Rakove, Jack. The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the 
Continental Congress. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979. 
Reid, John Phillip. Constitutional History of the American Revolution. Vol. I: The 
Authority of Rights. Madison, Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1986. 
Reid, John Phillip. Constitutional History of the American Revolution. Vol. II: The 
Authority to Tax. Madison, Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 
Reid, John Phillip. Constitutional History of the American Revolution. Vol. III: The 
Authority to Legislate. Madison, Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1991. 
Reid, John Phillip. Constitutional History of the American Revolution. Vol. IV: The 
Authority of Law. Madison, Wisconsin. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1993. 
Rodgers, Daniel T. “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept.” The Journal of American 
History 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 11-38. 
Rothbard, Murray N. “Modern Historians Confront the American Revolution.” Literature 
of Liberty 1, no. 1 (January/March 1978): 16-41. 
 
 
 
141 
Rothbard, Murray N. Conceived in Liberty. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises 
Institute, 2011. 
Rossiter, Clinton. Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of 
Political Liberty. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953. 
Ryan, Jr., Frank W. “The Role of South Carolina in the First Continental Congress” The 
South Carolina Historical Magazine 60, no. 3 (Jul., 1959):147-153. 
Savelle, Max. Seeds of Liberty: The Genesis of the American Mind. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948. 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution. PhD diss., 
Columbia University, 1917. 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. “The American Revolution Reconsidered.” Political Science 
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 1919): 61-78. 
Shalhope, Robert E. “Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an 
Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography.” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 29, no. 1 (January 1972): 49-80. 
Smith, Paul H. “The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Organization and Numerical 
Strength.” William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. 25 (1968): 258-77. 
Smith, Paul H., ed. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789. Vols. I-V. 
Washington: Library of Congress, 1976. 
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a 
Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, 
Before the Adoption of the Constitution. 2 vols. 2nd edition. Boston: Charles C. 
Little and James Brown, 1851. 
Upshur, Abel P. A Brief Enquiry into the True Nature and Character of Our Federal 
Government: Being a Review of Judge Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States. Philadelphia: John Campbell, 1863 [Petersburg, 1840]. 
van Tyne, Claude H. “Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical Study.” 
American Historical Review 12, no. 3 (April 1907): 529-545. 
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press, 
1964. 
Wirt, William. Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry. Philadelphia: 
Desilver Thomas, 1836. 
Wood, Gordon S. “What Made the Founders Different.” Lecture, Mercer University, 
Macon, GA, November 17, 2011/ 
Wood, Gordon S. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992. 
Wolf, Edwin. “The Authorship of the 1774 Address to the King Restudied.” The William 
and Mary Quarterly 22, no. 2 (April 1965): 189-224. 
 
 
 
142 
Yale Law School. “Constitution of South Carolina - March 26, 1776.” The Avalon 
Project. Accessed June 21, 2016. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sc01.asp. 
Yale Law School. “Constitution of New Hampshire - 1776.” The Avalon Project. 
Accessed June 21, 2016. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nh09.asp.  
